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Colón-Ríos: De-Constitutionalizing Democracy

DE-CONSTITUTIONALIZING DEMOCRACY
JOEL 1. COL6N-Rios*

Fear and self-assertion by denial were present at the moment of
great constitutional foundations. The acknowledgment that fear
drives the minds and pens of constitution makers, the admission of
human frailty, is not very attractive.1

Democracy and constitutionalism are on close personal terms.2
But it is the precise nature of that relationship which tends to divide
contemporary theorists. The prevailing orthodoxy is that
constitutionalism and democracy are so closely related that they are
two sides of the same coin; any tension between the two is more
apparent than real. 3 This dominant view presents constitutionalism as
the embodiment of democratic principles, such that a "constitutional
democracy" is considered to be the realization of the two ideals. In
contrast to this dominant view, this Article will defend the proposition
that only a "weak" form of constitutionalism, one in which democracy
is de-constitutionalized in important ways, can be rendered consistent

Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Victoria University of Wellington. Thank you to
Allan C. Hutchinson, Martin Hevia, Zoran Oklopcic, and Amaya Alvez for their
valuable comments and critiques to a previous draft of this paper.
1. ANDRAS SAJ6, LIMITING GOVERNMENT: AN INTRODUCTION TO
CONsTrrUTIONALISM 3 (1999).

2. Unless otherwise indicated, the terms "constitutionalism" and "liberal
constitutionalism" are used interchangeably to refer to the conception of
constitutionalism that informs liberal constitutional regimes, as those existing in
countries like the United States and Canada.
3. See, e.g., MICHAEL SAWARD, THE TERMS OF DEMOCRACY 56 (1998) ("The
term 'democracy' already incorporates a conception of constitutionalism. It is wrong
to separate them out; the resulting discussions may be illuminating in various ways,
but they can also be misleading in that they are based on a false premise of
separation and opposition."). But see, e.g., SAJ6, supra note 1, at 54 ("Democracy
and constitutionalism cannot be considered in any way the same. At best, their
relationship can be characterized as a tension bordering on animosity.").
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with the basic thrust of the democratic ideal.
By attempting to de-constitutionalize democracy, I do not suggest
there can be a democracy in the absence of constitutional forms. As
Christopher Eisgruber and Stephen Holmes have argued, people
cannot magically express their will in the absence of certain
institutions and procedures.4 In that sense, the de-constitutionalization
of democracy will always be partial and incomplete. But this does not
mean the constitutional forms and institutions that currently
characterize liberal constitutionalism are consistent with basic
democratic principles (much less that they are the most democratic
constitutional forms that one could aspire to). The goal of the
democrat should be to defend and propose institutions and procedures
that tend to realize democracy to the maximum degree possible, not to
find ways of justifying the constitutional regimes we already have.
There are different "angles" from which the tension between
constitutionalism and democracy can be examined. This Article is
primarily concerned with examining the ways in which democracy is
negated by constitutionalism's traditional approach to constitutional
change.5 An important clarification is in order here, so the objective
and focus of this Article are made clear from the beginning. Here,
constitutional change refers to constitutional amendments, to changes
in the constitutional text. Although, according to many contemporary
constitutional theorists, a liberal constitution is always in flux-a
"living tree" that is always changing through interpretation 6 -these
kinds of changes (while important) are not, in my view, a substitute
for democratic constitutional change. On the one hand, these changes
tend to be gradual in nature, and there are certain things that would be
very hard to do through constitutional interpretation (think, for
example, of moving from bicameralism to unicameralism, or the other
way around, through interpretation).7 There is, however, another,
4. CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 12
(2007); STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINTS: ON THE THEORY OF
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 167 (1995).
5. Although this Article draws some conclusions that are applicable to most
contemporary constitutional regimes, it will mostly engage with U.S. constitutional
theory.
6. See, e.g., W.J. WALUCHOW, A COMMON LAW THEORY OF JUDIcIAL REvIEW:
THE LIVING TREE 270-71 (2007).
7. See SANFORD LEvINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE
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more important reason for avoiding the focus on interpretation.
Regardless of the limits of constitutional interpretation as a means to
important constitutional transformations, the main problem with such
an approach is its lack of democratic credentials.
Interpretation is usually done by judges, and democratic
constitutional change must take place through procedures in which
popular majorities assume a central role. 8 This means that popular
majorities should be allowed to trigger and decide on important
constitutional changes, not merely that their views might (or should)
be taken into account by those interpreting the constitution. 9 At a time
when a democratic form of constitutionalism is increasingly
connected to a system in which courts are more or less responsive to
popular opinion,10 and in which imagining "what the law of the U.S.
Constitution should look like in the year 2020" is viewed as a matter
of being "free to interpret the Constitution differently than the

CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND How WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) 160

(2006).
8. John Hart Ely's approach to judicial review provides a good example of this
point. Ely maintained that neither of the major schools of constitutional
interpretation is successful in defending judicial review from the democratic
objection. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REvIEw 73 (1980). Interpretivism (e.g., originalist theories of interpretation) cannot
successfully claim to be simply about respecting the "will of the people" because, in
addition to the difficulties of discovering that will, the difficulty in amending the
constitution makes the "will of the people" equivalent to the will of previous
generations. Id. at 11-12. Non-interpretivism (e.g., "living-tree" theories of
interpretation) could only bring the constitution up to date by making judges
function as unelected legislators. Id. at 45-48. As a solution to this problem, Ely
advanced a powerful process-based defense of judicial review, according to which
judges would only strike down statutes that hinder the democratic process. Id. at 8687. However, it is interesting to think about the road Ely did not follow. That is to
say, instead of finding a way of limiting the power of judges in order to ameliorate
the democratic objection, Ely could have advanced a theory of constitutional
amendments according to which present generations could become the real authors
of their constitution.
9. See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic
Constitutionalismand Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 373, 373 (2007); see
also BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: How PUBLIC OPINION HAS
INFLUENCED

THE

SUPREME

COURT

AND

SHAPED

THE

MEANING

OF

THE

CONSTITuTION 14-16 (2009).

10. Post & Siegel, supra note 9, at 379.
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Supreme Court now does,"" it seems particularly important to reexamine the ways in which we understand both democracy and
constitutionalism. Now, perhaps more than ever, there appears to be
an irreversible tendency towards seeing the constitutional text as an
unchangeable default that one can only hope to expand through
interpretative mechanisms, and away from imagining a new or
importantly amended (and amendable) constitution.
Part I of this Article consists of an examination of the concept of
constitutionalism and of the ideology that drives it as a political
practice. Constitutionalism is characterized by a sacralization of the
constitutional regime, a defense of the permanence of the constitution
that has entrenched conceptions of what is thought to be the "right"
content. Its main objective is the closure of the political, the avoidance
of future exercises of constituent power.12 Against constitutionalism's
insistence on the permanence of the established constitutional text and
the consequent necessity of creating obstacles to any attempt to alter
it, democracy recommends that even the most fundamental principles
are subject to reformulation through democratic procedures. The ideal
of democratic openness, one of the basic components of democracy,
appears to be at odds with constitutionalism. Part II will be devoted to
a discussion of the ideal of democratic openness. Because
constitutions do much more than simply secure the conditions of
democratic debate, the ideal of democratic openness cannot be
rejected through an appeal to a constitution's "democracy enabling"
features (i.e., those provisions, such as basic political rights, that allow
democratic practices to take place).
Part III of this Article examines the second basic component of
democracy-namely, popularparticipationin the positing of all laws,
fundamental laws included. Popular participation is required by the
very meaning of democracy: democracy is a regime of popular selfgovernment, one in which those who live under a political order can
take part in its constitution and re-constitution. Popular participation
also played a central role in the writings of modern opponents of
democracy, who rejected democracy precisely because of the risks

11. Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Introduction to THE CONSTFUTION IN
2020 at 1, 1 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009) (emphasis added).
12. See MARTIN LOUGHLIN, THE IDEA OF PUBLIC LAw 68 (2003). The concept
of constituent power will be discussed in Part IV.
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associated with the participation of ordinary citizens in the making of
substantive decisions.1 3 However, in contemporary discussions about
what democracy requires in the context of contemporary constitutional
regimes, the ideal of popular participation has been moved to a
secondary plane. This view of democracy-in which popular
participation (understood as requiring something more than voting
every few years in regular elections and occasional referendums) is
seen as an unrealistic aspiration-has been happily inherited by
comfortably
with
as
it sits
constitutional
democracy,
constitutionalism's
attitude
towards
constitutional
change.
Contemporary constitutional theorists, even those of a progressive
persuasion, rarely talk about popular participation. Now, instead of
participating in the production of the fundamental laws, democratic
citizens mobilize in order to influence the ways in which officials
interpret the constitution.
Parts IV and V of this Article present a notion of constitutionalism
that is more consistent with the democratic ideal: weak
constitutionalism. Weak constitutionalism does not aspire to a final
reconciliation between constitutionalism and democracy. Instead, it
seeks to be consistent with democracy's basic components by
allowing ordinary citizens to approach the constitutional regime as
radically open, susceptible to any kind of modification. In this respect,
weak constitutionalism does not approach constituent power as a
threat, but as the possibility of correcting existing injustices. This
Article, it cannot be stressed enough, does not argue in favor of a
"flexible" constitution, if that term is understood as describing a
constitution that can be changed by simple legislative majorities.
Instead, weak constitutionalism supports the development of
procedures of constitutional change in which ordinary citizens, not
only state officials, are able to deliberate and decide on the content of
the laws that regulate their political association.
I. CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE FEAR OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

There are many definitions of constitutionalism. Constitutionalism
is often defined in association with ideas such as "restrained and

13. See infra Part III (discussing the work of constitutional theorists such as
Bodin, Ferguson, and Madison).
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divided" political power,14 government limited by the rule of law,' 5
the protection of fundamental rights,' 6 and, of course, the principle of
constitutional supremacy' 7 (which is based on a distinction between
ordinary and higher laws' 8 ). That these are the ideas that characterize
modern constitutionalism should not be a matter of controversy; in
fact, they do not seem like bad ideas at all. But this is not the whole
story. Constitutionalism is also characterized by a Lycurgianl9

obsession with permanence, a fear of constitutional change based on
the idea that a constitution that contains the right content-a good
constitution-should also be a finished constitution. That is, a
constitution that might be improved by correcting some historical
mistakes here and there (and that might even evolve and be expanded
through judicial interpretation), but whose fundamental principles and
the governmental structures it creates should be more or less
immutable and placed beyond the scope of democratic politics. 20 It is
this idea that is at odds with democracy. 2 1
14. Richard Bellamy & Dario Castiglione, Constitutionalism and Democracy:
Political Theory and the American Constitution, 27 BRrT. J. POL. SCI. 595, 595
(1997).
15. Stephen M. Griffin, Constitutionalism in the United States: From Theory
to Politics, 10 OxFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 200, 202 (1990).
16.
Michel Rosenfeld, Modern Constitutionalism as Interplay Between
Identity and Diversity, in CONSTITUTIONALISM,

IDENTITY,

DIFFERENCE, AND

LEGITIMACY 3, 5 (Michael Rosenfeld ed., 1994).
17. SAJO, supra note 1, at 39.
18.

See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 233 (expanded ed., 2005).

19. Lycurgus-who, according to Greek mythology, was a direct descendant
of Hercules and the author of the Spartan constitution-persuaded Spartans to
promise they would not alter the new constitution until he returned from the Delphic
oracle. Dennis Thompson, Democracy in Time: PopularSovereignty and Temporal
Representation, 12 CONSTELLATIONS 245, 251 (2005). When the oracle revealed to
him that he had prepared a good constitution, he killed himself and had his ashes
scattered in the ocean so that no one could ever maintain he had returned in any
form. Id. The constitution remained unaltered for 500 years. Id.
20. As will become clear later, my conception of "democratic politics" goes
beyond majoritarian decision-making in an elected legislature. See infra Part IV.
21. The U.S. Constitution provides a good example of immutability: not only
it is extraordinarily difficult to amend (through a process that can hardly be
described as democratic and participatory), but it is always presented in its original
form, with amendments not typographically integrated into the text but appearing at
the end. Claude Klein, A Propos Constituent Power: Some General Views in a
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This foundational component of constitutionalism has been
defended at different moments with different degrees of emphasis. In
eighteenth century France, Isaac Le Chapelier, the Jacobin jurist,
claimed "the Revolution is finished," because there were "no more
injustices to overcome, or prejudices to contend with."22 Some years
later, Napoleon issued a similar declaration: "Citizens, the revolution
is determined by the principles that began it. The constitution was
founded on the sacred rights of property, equality, freedom. The
revolution is over."23 The aspiration of permanency that drove Le
Chapelier's and Napoleon's dictums is alive and well, and, perhaps
today more than ever, continues to inform liberal constitutionalism. 24
Constitutional entrenchment, however, is driven by more than the
desire to preserve individual rights. It is also grounded in concern that
fundamental alteration of a constitution is looking for trouble, playing
with the stability of a political system, and risking the precious ideal
of the rule of law. In American constitutional thought, James Madison
articulated one of the first formulations of this view in response to
Thomas Jefferson's "dangerous" ideas about constitutional change.
Jefferson, it is well known, despised the idea of perpetual
constitutions. 25 He complained, "Some men look at constitutions with
sanctimonious reverence, and deem them like the arc of the covenant,
too sacred to be touched." 26 In his view, "laws and institutions must
go hand in hand with the progress of human mind" and those living
Modem Context, in NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS IN THE ERA OF INTEGRATION 33, 33
n.12 (Antero Jyrdinky ed., 1999).
22. See Lucien Jaume, Constituent Power in France: The Revolution and its
Consequences, in THE PARADOX OF CONSTITUTIONALISM: CONSTITUENT POWER
AND CONSTITUTIONAL FORM 67, 71 (Martin Loughlin & Neil Walker eds., 2007)
(citation omitted) (quoting Isaac Le Chapelier's September 1791 address to the
French National Assembly).
See ANTONIO NEGRI, INSURGENCIES: CONSTITUENT POWER AND THE
23.
MODERN STATE 2 (1999) (citation omitted) (quoting Napoleon's declaration issued
on December 15, 1798).
24. See generally MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM
THE COURTS 177-81 (1999) (discussing the liberal fear of constitutional revision).

25. See generally Victor M. Mufiiz-Fraticelli, The Problem of a Perpetual
Constitution, in INTERGENERATIONAL JUSTICE 377 (Axel Gosseries & Lukas Meyer
eds., 2009) (providing a contemporary defense of perpetual constitutions).
26. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), in THE
PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON 552, 558-59 (Merril D. Peterson ed., 1975).
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under a constitutional regime must be allowed to correct the mistakes
of previous generations. 27 Jefferson even suggested that at set periods
of time (every time a new generation came into place, which occurred
every nineteen years according to his interpretation of the European
tables of mortality), all laws and institutional arrangements should
lapse and periodic constitutional conventions should be convened. 2 8
These conventions would guarantee the present generation had the
"right to choose for itself the form of government it believes most
promotive of its own happiness."2 9
Madison disagreed with most of Jefferson's ideas about
constitutional change and constitutional conventions. He maintained
that Jefferson's ideas involved "[t]he danger of disturbing the public
tranquility by interesting too strongly the public passions." 30 It is not
that Madison defended the idea that a constitution could (or should)
never be changed. 3 ' However, he believed Jefferson's proposal

27. Id. at 559.
28. Id. at 560. A similar idea was defended by Rousseau, who proposed:
[Periodic assemblies] should always take the form of .. . two propositions
that may not be suppressed, which should be voted on separately. The first
is: Does it please the Sovereign to preserve the present form of
government? The second is: Does it please the people to leave its
administration in the hands of those who are actually in charge of it?
JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND THE DISCOURSES 269
(G.D.H. Cole trans., Everyman's Library ed. 1993) (1762). In the United States, the
current Constitution of the State of New York contains a provision that appears to
put Jefferson's theory into practice:
At the general election to be held in the year nineteen hundred fifty-seven,
and every twentieth year thereafter, and also at such times as the
legislature may by law provide, the question "Shall there be a convention
to revise the constitution and amend the same?" shall be submitted to and
decided by the electors of the state ....
N.Y. CONST. art. XIX, § 2.
29. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval, supra note 26, at 560.
30. THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, at 256 (James Madison) (Bantam Classic ed.,
1982).
31. In fact, he at least favored an important constitutional amendment. In a
letter to George Hay dated August 23, 1823, Madison argued in favor of modifying
the rules for electing the President. LEVINSON, supra note 7, at 95. But the kind of
amendment procedure he favored (the one contained in Article V) establishes
requirements that are so difficult to meet (in order, of course, to make constitutional
change difficult and unlikely) that it makes constitutional amendments almost
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suggested to the citizenry that their current system of government was
somehow defective, depriving the government of "that veneration
which time bestows on every thing, and without which perhaps the
wisest and freest governments would not possess the requisite
stability."32 Thus, instead of periodic constitutional conventions that,
by opening the constitution to the "decisions of the whole society" 33
interested "too strongly the public passions," 34 Madison favored a
complicated amendment procedure, one that involved a series of
extraordinary majorities at the federal and state levels-in other
words, an amendment procedure that would make constitutional
change difficult and unlikely, and whose usual protagonists were not
ordinary citizens (that would simply be too risky), 35 but state officials
already sitting in federal and state legislatures.
In contemporary constitutional theory, no one has followed
Madison's advice better than Kathleen Sullivan. Sullivan's critique of
what she calls amendmentitis (the unjustified desire to amend the
constitution) is not very far from the idea that a constitution should
never be altered. For Sullivan, amendments "are dangerous apart from
their individual merits."3 6 Not surprisingly, she maintains that
Jefferson's proposals about constitutional change were ignored for
good reasons. 37 According to Sullivan, a frequently amended
impossible. Id. at 21. And, when they actually take place, they are not adopted
through participatory procedures, but give certain groups extraordinary veto powers
that can render moot the will of popular majorities. Id. at 19.
32. THE FEDERALIST No. 49, supra note 30, at 256 (James Madison).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. As Sanford Levinson has expressed:
Although Madison was not opposed to constitutional amendments as such,
he clearly saw almost no role for a public that would engage in probing
questions suggesting that there might be serious "defects" in the
Constitution. Only philosophers (like himself?) or, perhaps, "patriotic
leaders" could be trusted to engage in dispassionate political dialogue and
reasoning.
LEVINSON, supra note 7, at 19.

36.
GREAT

Kathleen Sullivan, What's Wrong with Constitutional Amendments, in
AND

EXTRAORDINARY

OCCASIONS:

DEVELOPING

GUIDELINES

FOR

CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 39, 39 (Louis Michael Seidman & Virginia Sloan eds.,

1999).
37.

Kathleen Sullivan, Constitutional Amendmentitis, AM. PROSPECT (Sept.
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constitution decreases the people's confidence that their constitutional
system is stable, and undermines the idea of having a constitution in
the first place. 38 Amending a constitution also frequently obscures the
distinction between constitutional and ordinary politics, making the
supreme law lose its fundamental character and putting at risk its
coherence and generality. 39 Finally, amending the constitution might
help "politicize" it, and "the more a Constitution is politicized the less
it operates as a fundamental charter of government." 40 For these and
other reasons, Sullivan concludes the constitution should be amended
"only reluctantly and as a last resort." 41 (Although, notably, the
problems Sullivan identifies are not common.) While there are major
U.S. constitutional theorists who, for different reasons, argue against
the rigidity of Article V, 42 it is the Lycurgian approach to constitutions
and constitutional change that is well established in U.S. constitutional
theory and practice (although in a more subtle way than Sullivan

argues). 43
In constitutional theory, this view is exemplified in the writings of
21, 1995), http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=constitutionalamendmentitis.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Sullivan, supra note 36, at 42.
41. Sullivan, supra note 37. Sullivan's rejection of formal constitutional
amendments, of course, implicitly defends other modes of amending the constitution
(e.g., amendments by judicial interpretation). Id.; see also David Strauss, The
Irrelevance of ConstitutionalAmendments, 114 HARv. L. REV. 1457, 1467 (2001).
42. See, e.g., LEVINSON, supra note 7; Bruce Ackerman, Higher Lawmaking,
in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENT 63, 86 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995); Akhil Reed Amar, Popular
Sovereignty and Constitutional Amendment, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION,
supra, at 89, 90-92; Stephen M. Griffin, The Nominee is...Article V, in
CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES 51, 51-53 (William
Eskridge & Sanford Levinson eds., 1998); Donald Lutz, Toward a Theory of
ConstitutionalAmendment, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 355, 362 (1994).
43. Of course, this aspiration to permanence is not limited to U.S.
constitutional thought. For instance, a few weeks before the recent coup in Honduras
(triggered by President Manuel Zelaya's proposal to call a constituent assembly to
adopt a new constitution), a well known Honduran historian expressed that the
Constitution of Honduras did not need any reforms, since it was "complete," and
just needed "to be fully applied." La Cuarta Urna es Una Locura en Honduras [The
Fourth Ballot is Crazy in Honduras], EL HERALDO (Hond.) (Mar. 16, 2009),
http//www.elheraldo.hn/content/view/full/96983.
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scholars engaged in a defense of constitutionalism's democratic
credentials. Christopher Eisgruber and Stephen Holmes provide two
good examples." Eisgruber argues that self-government is perfectly
compatible with stable constitutional forms that are protected through
an inflexible amendment procedure. "If a polity is consumed with
endless debates about how to structure its basic political institutions, it
will be unable to formulate policy about foreign affairs, the economy,
the environment, zoning, and so on."4 5 For Eisgruber, inflexible
constitutions can be understood as a practical device for implementing
a non-majoritarian conception of democracy.4 6 Flexible amendment
procedures, on the contrary, may encourage "improvident reforms"
that would encumber later generations, and allow majorities to
consolidate power at the expense of the whole people.4 7 Although this
Article cannot do justice to Eisgruber's highly sophisticated argument,
his advice is, in the last instance, profoundly Madisonian:
constitutional text is better left alone. Moreover, if any adjustments
are needed, they can always be achieved through interpretation rather
than through formal amendments (in this sense, it is not surprising that
an important part of Eisgruber's book is dedicated to a defense of
judicial review).
This approach finds an important theoretical backbone in
Holmes's influential defense of constitutional pre-commitment.
Holmes argues that the fact that constitutions are generally very
difficult to amend does not mean they are inconsistent with basic
democratic principles.48 Rigid constitutions serve as a guarantee that
future generations will not eliminate the possibility of the formation of
a democratic public will. 49 By protecting basic political rights and
setting up institutions that allow citizens to deliberate on important
matters, constitutions become instruments of self-government,

44. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
45. EISGRUBER, supra note 4, at 13.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 12.
48. HOLMES, supra note 4, at 177 ("Only a rather inflexible pre-commitment
to certain procedural rules (guaranteeing, for example, the continuing right of
unpublished dissent) makes public learning possible.").
49. See id.
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techniques by which citizens rule themselves.5 0 Like the rules of a
game or the rules of grammar, constitutions are primarily enabling:
they allow a democratic form of political life to take place. Just as it
would make little sense to change the rules of grammar or the rules of
a game while writing or playing, it does not make much sense to
worry about the reformulation of these enabling norms. It is fair to
say, therefore, that Holmes's defense of pre-commitment is an
endorsement
of
constitutionalism's
Lycurgian
tendencies:
constitutional change should be difficult and unlikely, as a constitution
is simply too valuable to be meddled with.5
To see how this view manifests in constitutional practice, one
need only look at the amendment provisions of most modem
constitutions. These provisions usually involve a set of requirements
that are more difficult to meet than those followed when the
constitution was originally adopted. That is to say, while most
constitutions are adopted by some form of majority rule, constitutional
amendments are traditionally associated with supermajorities and
other obstacles designed to decrease the possibility of important
transformations.5 2 Some constitutions even place clauses outside the
50. See id. at 230.
51. A constitution does much more than allow democracy to take place. See
infra Part II.A.
52. Despite the frequently repeated statement that constitutions bind present
day majorities because they were adopted by supermajorities, the route usually
followed by most constituent assemblies around the world is to adopt constitutions
through simple majority rule (sometimes subjecting them to a popular referendum
before they come into effect), while at the same time requiring legislative
supermajorities (and, again, sometimes popular referendums) for constitutional
amendments to the newly created constitution. For example, the most recently
adopted constitution at the time of this Article, the Constitution of Ecuador, was
adopted through a constituent assembly which had the power to approve the
constitutional text (that would then be submitted to the electorate in a referendum)
through the affirmative vote of a majority of its members. See Reglamento de
Funcionamiento de la Asamblea Constituyente [Rules of Operation of the
Constituent Assembly], arts. 39-47 (Dec. 12, 2010), http://constituyente.
asambleanacional.gov.ec/index.php?option=com-content&Itemid=72&id=733&task
=view. However, the amendment rule they created requires legislative
supermajorities plus popular ratification. See CONSTITUCI)N DE LA REPOJBLICA DEL
ECUADOR [CONSTITUTION] Sept. 2008, arts. 441-442.
The constitutions of nations with a federal form of government are not
usually adopted by simple majority rule, as they require some form of ratification
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scope of the amendment procedure, thus highlighting the fear of
constitutional change that characterizes constitutionalism. 53 Moreover,
from the states or provinces. Thus, the U.S. Constitution had to be ratified by state
conventions. U.S. CONST. art. VII. It is also important to note that if only nine states
had ratified the Constitution, the remaining four states would not have been bound
by it. Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: ConstitutionalAmendment
Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 457, 488 n. 115 (1994). In that sense, the
relevant rule was not the 9/13 majority, but the decision-making rule used in each of
the ratifying states, which were at that moment considered sovereign entities. See id.
at 487, n. 112. It is well known that each of those conventions used majority rule as
the decision-making method (in fact, in some states the vote was very close, like in
New York, where the vote was 30-27). Id. at 486-87. In addition, the delegates to the
Philadelphia Convention do not appear to have been bound by a supermajority rule
for agreeing to send the draft constitution to the states for ratification (although
thirty-nine out of fifty-five delegates signed it). See ROBERT A. GOLDWIN, FROM
PARCHMENT TO POWER: How JAMES MADISON USED THE BILL OF RIGHTS TO SAVE

THE CONSTITUTION 27 (1997). However, the amendment rule they proposed required

a two-thirds majority of both legislative houses (or application of two thirds of state
legislatures) to propose amendments, which had to be ratified by three-fourths of the
states. U.S CONST. art. V. Thus, the process that led to the adoption of the U.S.
Constitution was actually much more majoritarian than is usually thought, and the
amendment procedure of the U.S. Constitution involves requirements more difficult
to meet than those present when the Constitution was adopted. This obviously raises
questions from the perspective of democratic legitimacy (e.g., What entitles
constitution-makers to establish procedures for changing the constitution that are
more difficult to meet than the one they were required to use?) that are outside the
scope of this Article.
53. The most famous example is Article 79.3 of the German Basic Law:
"Amendments to this Basic Law affecting the division of the Federation into Linder,
their participation on principle in the legislative process, or the principles laid down
in Articles 1 and 20 [Human Rights] shall be inadmissible." GRUDGESETZ FUR DIE
BUNDESRUPLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [BASIC LAW], May 23, 1949,

BGBL. VII, art. 79(3) (Ger.), translatedin 7 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF
THE WORLD: GERMANY 36 (Riidiger Wolfrum & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 2009); see
also Art. 2 COSTrruzIONE [CONSTITUTION] (It.), translated in 9 CONSTITUTIONS OF
THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD: ITALY 1 (Rtidiger Wolfrum & Gisbert H. Flanz eds.,
2006); CONSTrrUICAO DA REP(JPLICA PORTUGUESA [CONSTITUTION] arts. 288-289

(Port.), translated in 15 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD:
PORTUGAL 122 (Rtidiger Wolfrum & Rainer Grote eds., 2005); TURKIYE
CUMHURIYETI ANAYASASI [CONSTITUTION] art. 4 (Turk.), translated in 18
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD: TURKEY 3 (RUdiger Wolfrum &

Rainer Grote eds., 2010).
There are two examples of explicit unamendability in Article V of the U.S.
Constitution: 1) the provision that prohibits any amendment made prior to 1808
from affecting Article I, Section 9, clauses 1 and 4; and 2) the provision that no
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the amendment processes of most liberal constitutions are not
characterized by being particularly participatory, in the sense that they
do not give ordinary citizens a central role (other than the occasional
vote in a referendum).
By making constitutional change difficult and unlikely,
constitutions also make popular constitutional change difficult and
unlikely. Typical amendment procedures not only prevent
constitutional change by serving as the exclusive means through
which a juridical system regulates its transformation; they cancel
ordinary citizens' ability to transform their constitution in important
ways, or to replace it with a new one. They treat constitutional change
as a special type of law-making, one that takes place in the ordinary
legislature but through special voting rules (i.e., supermajority
requirements). In so doing, they prevent future exercises of constituent
power (understood as the faculty for positing new constitutional
regimes through highly participatory procedures) to take place. 54 in

state, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate. U.S.
CONST. art. V. Both these are examples of partialunamendability: in the first case,
the prohibition was a temporary one; in the second case, there is no absolute
prohibition of depriving a state of its equal suffrage in the Senate (any state can be
deprived of its equal suffrage, as long as it consents to it and the requirements of the
regular amendment process are met).
The concept of constituent power will be briefly discussed in Part IV of this
Article, when weak constitutionalism is introduced.
54. John Locke's theory of popular sovereignty, which serves as one of the
theoretical bases of liberal constitutionalism, provides a good example of this
approach. See generally JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (1689). For
Locke, the people's power to re-constitute government (the "supreme power" of the
people) only appears after government dissolves itself by acting with "a calculated
design to subvert the law and public liberty as such." JULIAN H. FRANKLIN, JOHN
LOCKE AND THE THEORY OF SOVEREIGNTY; MIXED MONARCH & THE RIGHT OF
RESISTANCE IN THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION 95 (1978).

In the meantime, the re-constitution of government is not a "constitutional"
possibility for the "sovereign people," and the people's constituent power is
"channeled" through an amendment procedure operated exclusively by state
officials. Cf Amar, supra note 52, at 463 (arguing that, at least in the U.S., the
Lockean right to revolution was legalized after the American Revolution, and from
then on the people could exercise their right to re-constitute government "at any
time and for any reason"). At a theoretical level, this is an interesting argument, but,
at the level of actual constitutional practice, it seems clear that things work very
differently.
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countries with very rigid constitutions, like the United States,
constitutionalism's insistence on permanence is not only reflected in
the difficulty of amending the constitution or in the virtual
prettification of the constitutional text.55 Perhaps more important (and
discouraging) is that this conception has had an important impact in
the work of progressive constitutional theorists. 5 6 The fact that the
U.S. Constitution (as most constitutions) can only be changed with
difficulty has created among theorists a sort of fatigue, an
internalization of the fact that the constitutional text will not change.
This fatigue usually takes the form of promoting constitutional
interpretation as the main site where constitutional change takes place,
or in looking at the ordinary legislative process as the exclusive site
for democratic or popular politics.
There is, of course, nothing wrong with finding new ways of
understanding a constitution in order to procure particular political
goals, or in attempting to influence ordinary legislation to further
those goals. In fact, those are the ways in which the citizenry of a
contemporary political community is more likely to advance its
political preferences. The fatigue referred to here, however, is
different. It is first characterized by scholars identifying an important
institution, or principle, that would help realize arguably fundamental
goals and recognizing it as an appropriate matter for

55. Henry Monaghan has described the constitution as "practically
unamendable." Henry Paul Monaghan, Doing Originalism, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 32,
35 (2004). The U.S. Constitution has been amended only twenty-seven times in over
two centuries, and it is telling that the ratification of the Twenty-seventh
Amendment (variance of congressional compensation) took 200 years. It was
ratified in 1992, after being originally presented by James Madison in 1789. Richard
Bernstein, The Sleeper Wakes: The History and Legacy of the Twenty-Seventh
Amendment, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 497, 497 (1992). Constitutionalism's insistence
on the permanence of the constitutional regime does not mean, however, that
ordinary citizens, as well as legislators, do not engage in the activity of proposing
constitutional changes. For example, it is estimated that since 1789 more than
10,000 amendments have been proposed in Congress. See C-Span's Capitol
Questions, C-SPAN.ORG (2000), http://www.c-span.org/questions/weekly54.asp. It
just means that those changes have little, if any, possibility of becoming a
constitutional reality.
56. A very important exception here is Sanford Levinson, who engages in
making specific proposals for the structural transformation of a constitution that he
considers undemocratic in many aspects. See LEVINSON, supra note 7, at 167-80.
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constitutionalization. Then, instead of suggesting the constitutional
forms that could embody those principles or institutions, the theorist
quickly mentions (or simply assumes) the difficulty in amending the
constitution and/or claims that an amendment is in any case
unnecessary. Finally, she moves to a discussion about how the desired
goals can be achieved through interpretation of the existing
constitutional text and/or about how the necessary institutions or
principles can be brought into existence through ordinary legislation.
Consider, for example, Pamela S. Karlan's approach to voting
rights. After demonstrating the various ways in which different groups
of people are effectively disenfranchised in the United States, and
insisting that the United States needs to transform the constitutional
construction of the right to vote to recognize voting as "a fundamental
structural element of our constitutional democracy," 57 Karlan writes:
"While some activists and legislators have suggested the need for a
new constitutional amendment recognizing the affirmative right to
vote, my own view is that the existing constitutional provisions are
sufficient."5 8 In a similar fashion, in an essay about social and
economic rights in the United States, William E. Forbath argues that
the idea of economic redistribution is "more likely to seem
constitutionally suspect than constitutionally commanded." 59 Forbath
asks: "What is to be done? How, if at all, should the Constitution be
interpreted to safeguard social rights or a social minimum in the
twenty-first century?" 60 While Karlan and Forbath insist on the
potential of constitutional interpretation to bring about progressive
constitutional change, Frank Michelman and Robin West look to the
legislature. Here, the constitutional text also remains unchanged, and
the idea is to "force" legislators to be faithful to what the constitution
already promises.
Thus, while also promoting constitutional recognition of positive
rights, West attempts to answer the question of "whether the

57. Pamela S. Karlan, Voting Rights and the Third Reconstruction, in THE
CONSTrrTroN IN 2020, supra note 11, at 159, 160.
58. Id. at 164.
59. William E. Forbath, Social and Economic Rights in the American Grain:
Reclaiming ConstitutionalPoliticalEconomy, in THE CONSTTUTION IN 2020, supra
note 11, at 55, 56 (emphasis added).
60. Id.
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Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equality implies the existence
of social or economic welfare rights." 61 However, distrustful of courts,
West invites us to think of a "legislated Constitution . . . the
Constitution that legislators are duty-bound to uphold" 62 and that is
already equipped to become a vehicle for egalitarian politics.
Michelman's proposal for the ways the U.S. constitutional regime
should approach economic power provides another example of this
strategy. In a recent essay, after identifying a set of background
conditions for economic power's formation and distribution that most
left liberals in the United States would happily endorse, Michelman
writes: "Now, let's face it: Constitutional amendment is next to
impossible under U.S. rules. In this instance, the effort would have to
overcome ferocious partisan resistance on the substance." 63 He then
adds, "The prospects for amendment do not appear bright, and it
seems the political energy would be better spent on the ordinary
politics of election and legislation . . . ."64
One should not necessarily reject these authors' analyses or
prescriptions. They present attractive proposals and their diagnoses of
the likelihood of a constitutional amendment are accurate. But the fact
that constitutional theorists of progressive political persuasions, like
Karlan, Forbath, West, and Michelman, have learned to operate and to
develop their theories by taking the existing constitutional text as an
unchangeable default evidences the power and effects of the
prevailing notion of constitutionalism. More problematic, however, is
the fact that this kind of approach, while resulting from the practical
manifestation of constitutionalism's obsession with permanence (e.g.,
the difficulty in amending a constitution), also reproduces it. That is
to say, if everything can be achieved through interpretation, why ever
worry about changing the constitutional text? Or, if ordinary
61. Robin West, The Missing Jurisprudence of the Legislated Constitution, in
THE CONSTITTION IN2020, supra note 11, at 79, 80.
62. Id. at 86.
63. Frank Michelman, Economic Power and the Constitution, in THE
CONSTITUTION IN 2020, supra note 11, at 45, 53.
64. Id. For a similar approach, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF
RIGHTS: FDR's UNFINISHED REvOLUTION AND WHY WE NEED IT MORE THAN EVER
180 (2004). Michelman's approach rests on Sunstein's idea of "constitutive
commitments," defined as "highest-priority, popular, canonical expectations for the
conduct of government." Michelman, supra note 63, at 45-46.
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legislation is enough to realize the set of principles and institutions
that are thought desirable from a particular political perspective, why
worry about designing more participatory mechanisms for
constitutional change? The problems calling for changes in the design
of participatory mechanisms for constitutional change will, however,
become clear.
II. DEMOCRATIC OPENNESS, THE FIRST BASIC
COMPONENT OF DEMOCRACY

It is not difficult to understand why the prevailing conception of
constitutionalism, as well as the political practice it produces is, at the
very least, in tension with the idea of democracy and, at worst,
incompatible with it. If my depiction of constitutionalism and its
accompanying ideology is accurate, democrats stand for all
constitutionalists fear. It is true that democracy is one of the most
contested terms of our political culture, and it is far from clear what
democracy requires in the context of large and complex societies.
There are some basic ideas, however, that are inherent to the principle
of "the rule by the people" (democracy's specific and literal
meaning). 65 Once one begins to depart from these ideas, democracy
quickly becomes something else. First, a democratic society is an open
society, that is, one in which even the most fundamental principles are
always susceptible to being reformulated or replaced through
democratic procedures. Democratic openness welcomes conflict and
dissent, and is incompatible with untouchable abstract principles. A
democratic society, like Cornelius Castoriadis's vision of a just
society, is "not a society that has adopted just laws, once and for all,
rather it is a society where the question of justice remains constantly
open." 66
The idea of an open society is directly related to the principle of
the "rule by the people" in one fundamental sense. To say the people
rule themselves is to say they are a "self-governing" people: a group
65. Ellen Meiksins Wood, Democracy: An Idea of Ambiguous Ancestry, in
ATHENIAN POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 59, 59 (J. Peter Euben et al. eds., 1994).
66. ALLAN C. HUTCHINSON, IT'S ALL IN THE GAME: A NONFOUNDATIONALIST ACCOUNT OF LAW AND ADJUDICATION 258 (2000); see also
Cornelius Castoriadis, Socialism and Autonomous Society, 43 TELOS 91, 104 (1980).
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of human beings that come together as political equals and give
themselves the laws that will regulate their conduct and the
institutions under which they live. This involves two important and
related points. First, for these rules to be the people's own, it must be
today's people who rule, not past generations, however wise or wellintentioned their act of constitution-making was, or whatever the
content of the provisions they adopted. The idea of pre-commitment
(perfectly attuned to the logic of constitutionalism) cannot be brought
to a final reconciliation with democracy. 6 7 A self-governing people
must be able to reformulate their conmmitments democratically.
Second, for there to be democratic self-rule, no rule can be taken for
granted or be impossible (or virtually impossible) to change. 68 In this
sense, the idea of placing stringent requirements on constitutional
amendments, and of course, the less common practice of placing part
of the constitutional text outside the scope of the amending procedure,
are in a clear tension with the ideal of democratic openness.
As Claude Lefort put it, democracy allows "no law that can be
fixed, whose articles cannot be contested, whose foundations are not
susceptible of being called into question." 69 This openness, of course,
is always a limited openness, because, for a rule to be truly open to
change, practices such as criticism and dissent must also be possible,

67.

But cf Stephen Holmes, Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy,

in CONSTrrUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 195, 226 (Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad

eds., 1993) (arguing that constitutional pre-commitment is in principle both
democratic and majoritarian).
68. See ALAN KEENAN, DEMOCRACY IN QUESTION: DEMOCRATIC OPENNESS
IN A TIME OF POLITICAL CLOSURE 10 (2003). Although rare, there are some
constitutions that make it "illegal" to propose certain constitutional changes. For
example, Article 239 of the Constitution of Honduras establishes that whoever
proposes to alter the rule prohibiting presidential re-election will be immediately
removed from office and prevented from exercising any public function for a term
of ten years. CONSTITUCION DE LA REPJBLICA DE HONDURAS [CONSTITUTION] art.

239 (Hond.), translated in 8 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD:
HONDURAS 60 (Gisbert H. Flanz ed., Reka Koerner trans., 1997). This is, of course,
the provision that the perpetrators of the 2009 coup used to legally justify their
actions. Miguel Estrada, Honduras' Non-Coup: Under the Country's Constitution,
the Ouster of President Manuel Zelaya Was Legal, L.A. TIMES (July 10, 2009),
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jul/10/opinion/oe-estradal0.
69. Claude Lefort, The Image of the Body and Totalitarianism,in POLITICAL
FORMS OF MODERN SOCIETY 292, 303-04 (John B. Thompson ed., 1986).
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and rights such as freedom of speech and association must be
respected as a matter of political practice. These limits to democratic
openness, however, are limits to democracy itself. Consider the case
of a people who decide to abolish a constitution that provides for
institutions that allow for democratic self-rule and, instead, empower a
sovereign dictator. In this situation, one must distinguish between the
procedure by which a decision is taken (e.g., a democratic procedure)
and its outcome, or, as Jeremy Waldron has put it, between democratic
means and democratic ends. 70 Thus, if a political community chooses
to establish a dictatorial regime, it does not follow that that regime
would be democratic-even if it was born out of a democratic
process.7 1 These people would not have simply supplanted one set of
institutions for another. Such a regime would be in violation of the
very idea of democracy: it would preclude the possibility of "rule by
the people," supplanting it by the rule of one individual.
To say that in a democracy everything is open for replacement,
then, is to recognize that democracy always involves the risk of
abolishing itself. Castoriadis put it clearly: "In a democracy people
can do anything-and must know that they ought not to do just
anything. Democracy is the regime of self-limitation; therefore it is
also the regime of historical risk-another way of saying that it is the
regime of freedom-and a tragic regime."7 3 Democracy, there should
be no doubt about it, is always a risk, but a risk that a democrat-to
remain a democrat-has no choice but to accept.7 4 One might argue it
70. See JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 291 (1999).
71. Id. at 255.
72. As Walter Murphy expressed, "[If citizens destroy their own right to have
rights, they destroy their authority to legitimize a political system." WALTER
MURPHY, CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY: CREATING AND MAINTAINING A JUST
POLITICAL ORDER 507 (2007).

73. Cornelius Castoriadis, The Greek Polis and the Creation of Democracy, 9
GRADUATE FAC. PHIL. J. 79 (1983), reprinted in THE CASTORIADIS READER 267,

282 (David Ames Curtis ed., 1997).
74. Even Rawls seems to agree on this point:
I deny, then, that liberalism leaves political and private autonomy in
unresolved competition. That is my first claim. The second is that the
dilemma liberalism supposedly faces is a true dilemma, since, as I have
said, the two propositions are correct. One says: no moral law can be
externally imposed on a sovereign democratic people; and the other says:
the sovereign people may not justly (but may legitimately) enact a law
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is precisely as a result of these risks that there exist constitutions,
fundamental and supreme laws that limit the actions of governments
and peoples, and why the ideal of the "rule of law" as opposed to the
"rule of men" is cherished. Moreover, one might argue, this is why
constitutions must be difficult to change, and why altering them
should only be done "reluctantly and at the last resort."75 But those
arguments greatly overestimate the power of traditional constitutional
protections. If there are some forms of oppression that we consider
unthinkable in contemporary liberal societies, it is not because there
are laws or constitutions against such practices, but because it would
be hard to imagine any group or individual with a political force
capable of imposing them.
If we can be reasonably certain that the re-establishment of slavery
tomorrow in the United States or in a European country is
extremely improbable, the "reasonable" character of our forecast is
based not on the existing laws or constitutions (for then we would
be simply idiotic) but on a judgment concerning the active response
of a huge majority of the people to such an attempt. 76
Respect for the rights and institutions that are usually cherished in
liberal democracies, in the end, is less the consequence of the
entrenchment of the relevant legal and constitutional protections than
a result of what may be identified as a "political culture of mutual
respect."7 7 Why not, a constitutionalist might nevertheless ask, protect
these rights and institutions through a constitution that is difficult to
change, just as an additional safeguard? My answer to that question,
as argued in the next Part of this Article, is: by making constitutions
impervious to change to protect principles and institutions that make
violating those rights. These statements simply express the risk for
political justice of all government, democratic or otherwise; for there is no
human institution-political or social, judicial or ecclesiastical-that can
guarantee that legitimate (or just) laws are always enacted and just rights
always respected.
RAWLS, supra note 18, at 416.
75. Sullivan, supra note 37.
76. See Castoriadis,supra note 73, at 283.
77. WALDRON, supra note 70, at 310. Robert Dahl makes a similar point in a
hypothetical dialogue between a procedural and a constitutional democrat. ROBERT
DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 172-73 (1989).
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democracy possible (the right to public debate for example), one also
protects principles and institutions whose connection with democracy
is weak (or non-existent). Those principles and institutions only
weakly connected to democracy might have the potential to promote
forms of inequality that run counter to the democratic ideal.
A. The Extra-DemocraticEffects of Constitutions
If democratic openness is one of the basic components of
democracy, and Lycurgian tendencies drive constitutionalism, how
could we have reached a point in which democracy and
constitutionalism appear as "partners in principle," 79 to use Dworkin's
phrase? One possible answer is that, as suggested above, many of the
rights and institutions traditionally protected by liberal constitutions
are fundamental to the exercise of democracy or guarantee that
individuals are treated as equal citizens by the state. In that sense, it is
easy to see the limits to democratic openness as embodied in a liberal
constitution or, to use constitutionalists' preferred term, in a
constitutional democracy. The problem, of course, is that this fear of
constitutional change is not limited to the protection of the rights and
institutions that, according to these theorists, are constitutive of
democracy; it extends to the entire organization of government and the
economy. Thus, when constitutionalists talk about making a
constitution difficult to change to protect or advance democracy they
are also advocating the protection of the traditional liberal system of
governance and an understanding of the market as a central feature of
democractic life.80 That is, they are also making more difficult
profound constitutional transformations that, while promoting
progressive political goals and being perfectly consistent with basic
democratic principles, are incompatible with aspects of liberal

78. In the same way certain constitutional forms can contribute to inequality,
constitutions can promote egalitarian political projects. The constitutional
recognition of social and economic rights (which render the rights inalterable by
ordinary legislative majorities) is perhaps the most obvious example.
79. Ronald Dworkin, Equality, Democracy, and the Constitution: We the
People in Court, 28 ALBERTA L. REV. 324, 346 (1990).
80. C.B. MACPHERSON, DEMOCRATIC THEORY: ESSAYS IN RETRIEvAL 6
(1973).
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governance whose connections to democracy are not very strong.8 1
It is surprising that the fact that constitutions do much more than
simply establish "the rules of the game" (understood as the rules that
make democratic decision-making processes possible and enable
human beings to govern themselves) is absent from many discussions
about the relationship between constitutionalism and democracy. This
point is well exemplified in Holmes's work, briefly examined above. 8 2
The problem, as David Schneiderman has written, is that Holmes, as a
good constitutionalist, "chooses to stress the structural and procedural
aspects of constitutional rules," ignoring the fact that constitutions
also contain other provisions, such "as those concerning liberty and
property," which are less obviously related to democratic will
formation but have important implications for the daily lives of
individuals. 83 Put bluntly, liberal constitutions can also promote

81. See Jtirgen Habermas, ConstitutionalDemocracy: A ParadoxicalUnion of
Contradictory Principles?,29 POL. THEORY 766, 770 (2001) ("The conclusion that
the constitution is in some sense inherent in democracy is certainly plausible. But
the argument put forth as justification is inadequate because it refers only to part of
the basic law, the part immediately constitutive for institutions of opinion-and
will-formation-that is, it refers only to rights of political participation and
communication. But liberty rights make up the core of basic rights-habeas corpus,
freedom of religion, property rights-in short, all those liberties that guarantee an
autonomous life conduct and the pursuit of happiness."). Habermas's solution to this
problem lies in his co-originality thesis. Id. at 767.
82. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
83. DAVID
SCHNEIDERMAN,
CONSTITUTIONALIZING
ECONOMIC
GLOBALIZATION: INVESTMENT RULES AND DEMOCRACY'S PROMISE 12 (2007). It is
not that individual rights, such as the right to private property, freedom of religion,
and fights to privacy in general cannot be understood has having important
connections to the democratic ideal. Individual rights, after all, can be seen as a
precondition for citizens' full participation in a democratic polity: without a secure
place in the world to think and act free of state interference, individuals can hardly
form political opinions and develop their capacities to deliberate with others. For
instance, Frank Michelman has argued the fight to private property can be thought of
as necessary "to imbue citizens with the independence" to engage in popular selfgovernment. Frank Michelman, Possession vs. Distribution in the Constitutional
Idea of Property, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1319, 1334 (1987). More recently, Corey
Brettschneider has argued that freedom of conscience is essential to democracy
because it "ensures that self-rulers will be able to think for themselves about
political problems without being subject to external coercion." COREY
BRETTSCHNEIDER, DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS: THE SUBSTANCE OF SELF-GOVERNMENT

45 (2007). But these rights, like fundamental rights in general, can be understood
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different economic and political inequalities, and in doing so hinder
rather than enable or protect democracy. 84
An obvious example is property rights.85 On its face, the right to
private property is neutral: it guarantees that any individual's property
will neither be confiscated by the state without compensation nor
trespassed by strangers. But of course, if the allocation of property is
unjustly unequal at the moment a constitution is adopted, the
inevitable result is protection of an unjust status quo. 86 In this sense,
the kind of neutrality that is protected is a "status quo neutrality," to
use Cass Sunstein's phrase. Arguably, those who possess greater
amounts of property will tend to enjoy greater degrees of political
influence, while those without property will frequently lack the time
and energy to be involved in political activity. The anti-democratic
character of Lycurgian constitutionalism can be observed clearly in
this context. Suppose a progressive social movement promotes the
adoption of a set of legal reforms directed at different forms of
economic redistribution. The leaders of the movement discover that in
order for those reforms to be legally valid, the constitutional
and interpreted in ways that exceed their connection to the democratic ideal (for
example, giving corporations an unlimited right to contribute to political campaigns
or the right to sell certain medicines at prices that cannot be afforded by most
people, has little to do with the right to freedom of expression and the right to
property when understood in light of their democratic connections). If the objective
of constitutionalism was actually protecting the rights and institutions required for
democracy, then we would see constitutions that made an effort to entrench only
those outgrowths of fundamental rights that are connected to democracy.
84. This is well exemplified in critiques posed by the left to liberal
constitutionalism. See, e.g., Stephen Gill, Constitutionalizing Inequality and the
Clash of Globalization,4 INT'L STUD. REV. 46, 59-61 (2002).
85. For a helpful discussion of private property in American constitutionalism,
see Jennifer Nedelsky, American Constitutionalism and the Paradox of Private
Property, in CONSTrruTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 67, at 241.

86. Of course, it is true that private property is, in a way, connected to
democracy and its corollary of popular participation: Only human beings that are
able to satisfy their needs are likely able to devote time and energy to political
activities. See, e.g., Frank Michelman, Property as a ConstitutionalRight, 38 WASH.
& LEE L. REv. 1097, 1112-13 (1981). My point is that there are different ways of
understanding the right to private property, but only certain ways are
constitutionalized and therefore protected from the ordinary avenues of democratic
reformulation.
87.

See CASS SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 3 (1998).
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regulation of property must be transformed in important ways.
Accordingly, they direct their efforts toward a constitutional
amendment.8 8 When they attempt to do so, however, they are
confronted with a constitution that is not only very difficult to change,
but whose change lies in the exclusive hands of government (i.e., they
cannot initiate the process themselves through some form of popular
petition) and can easily be blocked by a minority of ordinary
legislators. Even if one disagrees with this group's objectives, it is
easy to understand why assurance that "the constitution is difficult to
change in order to facilitate democracy" would probably not satisfy
them.
There is an obvious constitutionalist rejoinder to this kind of
argument. The problem is not the constitutional text or the fact that it
can only be amended by supermajorities. Rights are abstract and can
be interpreted in a number of ways. In fact, in most countries the
scope and limits of rights are the result of how they have been
interpreted by courts. 89 Courts, however, are not always on the side of
social justice. 90 In fact, there are many reasons to be skeptical that
"any significant durable successes in terms of egalitarian distribution
of social resources can be achieved through federal constitutional
litigation." 9 1 Moreover, as Frank Michelman has observed, courts that
seek to enforce traditional constitutional protections can easily get in

88. Some Latin American constitutions, for example, in addition to
recognizing different forms of property (e.g., public, private, communitarian, mixed,
collective, etc.), "condition" the enjoyment of private property upon a set of
requirements (e.g., that a given use serves a social function). See, e.g.,
CONsTrrUcION DE LA REP(JBLICA DEL ECUADOR [CONSTITUTION] Sept. 2008, art.

321; NUEVA CONSTITUCION POLITICA DEL ESTADO [CONSTITUTION] Oct. 2008, art.
56 (Bol.), translated in 2 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD:
BOLIVIA 18 (Rtidiger Wolfrum & Rainer Grote eds., 2009).
89. See RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND
CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM 100-01 (2004).
90. As Dworkin has recognized, "Even a judge who believes that abstract
justice requires economic equality cannot interpret the equal protection clause as
making equality of wealth, or collective ownership of productive resources, a
constitutional requirement, because that interpretation simply does not fit American
history or practice, or the rest of the Constitution." RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S
LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 11 (1996).
91. Richard T. Ford, Hopeless Constitutionalism,Hopeful Pragmatism,in THE
CONSTITUTION IN 2020, supra note 11, at 143, 146.
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the way of different types of reforms:
Judges honouring claims to constitutional protection for freedoms
of speech and association can stymie efforts to fashion a set of
media policies aimed against undue concentrations of power to
control public discourse, or a set of electoral practices designed to
minimize conversions of economic into political power. Judges
honouring claims to private liberty, property, and freedom from
racial classifying may block employment legislation directed
toward equal opportunity or decent conditions of work, or housing
legislation aimed at giving everyone a chance for adequate
housing. 92
From the perspective of democratic openness, the problem is that
judicial interpretations of rights become part of constitutional reality,
alterable only through a subsequent ruling or through a constitutional
amendment. In that sense, the constitutionalist rejoinder helps to stress
the original point: the only way for a popular majority to
democratically (i.e., through participatory procedures) alter those
judicial interpretations is through constitutional re-making.
Constitutions, as well as their official interpretations, can have
important anti-democratic effects. Placing their content beyond the
scope of democratic politics cannot be defended in terms of protecting
democracy from itself, particularly when some of the changes that
might be considered "unconstitutional" (like the ones enumerated by
Michelman) would likely improve the quality of life, as well as the
prospects for participation and deliberation on public issues by many
citizens. A liberal constitution is not simply a charter that makes lawmaking possible, a charter not cluttered "with amendments relating to
substantive matters" that present an "insidious danger [that] lies in the
weakening effect they would have on the moral force of the
Constitution itself."93 Liberal constitutions are already cluttered up
with substantive matters, and do not merely set up the procedures
through which ordinary laws are adopted.
Constitutions also set up the basic structure of government, and
the types of structures and institutions they create might not be
92. Michelman, supra note 63, at 49.
93. Lon Fuller, American Legal Philosophyat Mid-Century, 6 J. LEGAL EDUC.
457, 463-64 (1954).
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particularly conducive to democracy. Yet these mechanisms can only
be altered with great difficulty. There are, naturally, different sorts of
arguments against this kind of structural change, particularly
arguments that point towards a polity's need for stability. 94 Stability,
however, cannot mean these structural elements can never be changed
(that would be prettification rather than stability), and yet that is the
practical effect rigid constitutions have. For example, in the United
States as well as in other countries, there is a considerable amount of
literature about the allegedly undemocratic character of judicial
review. 95 There are also other mechanisms and institutions, such as
national recall referendums, 96 the adoption of an electoral system
based on the principle of proportional representation, 9 7 and
unicameralism, 98 which perhaps would increase the quality of
democracy.
Abolishing judicial review, or adopting any of the previously
mentioned mechanisms and institutions, would require alterations in
the constitutional text that, even if supported by great majorities of the
population, would be very difficult to achieve in a system in which the
traditional obstacles to constitutional amendments are present and in
which the power of constitutional reform lies in the exclusive hands of

94. See, e.g., EISGRUBER, supra note 4.
95. The best-known critic of U.S. style judicial review is Jeremy Waldron. See
Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J.
1346, 1388 (2006). See generally ALLAN C. HUTCHINSON, WAITING FOR CORAF: A
CRITIQUE OF LAW AND RIGHTS (1995) (providing a critique of how the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms has pushed individual rights interpretation into the
courts); LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004) (presenting a conception of judicial review as the
process through which constitutional law is interpreted and enforced but not made);
TUSHNET, supra note 24. For an excellent discussion and disaggregation of the
different critiques of judicial review, see Larry Alexander, What is the Problem of
JudicialReview?, 31 AUSTRALIAN J. LEGAL PHIL. 1 (2006).
96. See, e.g., THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF
INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL (1989).

97. See, e.g., M.L. BALINSKI & H. PEYTON YOUNG, FAIR REPRESENTATION:
MEETING THE IDEAL OF ONE MAN ONE VOTE (2d ed. 2001).
98. For a discussion of unicameralism, see AREND LIPHART, PATTERNS OF
DEMOCRACY: GOVERNMENT FORMS AND PERFORMANCE IN THIRTY-SIX COUNTRIES

(1999).
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government. 99 In short, there are many ways of democratizing a
political system that require fundamental constitutional re-making,
and the fact that those changes lie outside the scope of democratic
politics can hardly be made consistent with a commitment to
democracy. But democratic politics is not limited to ordinary lawmaking, that is, to the kind of activities that take place inside
legislatures. Democracy requires the greatest degree of popular
participation possible in the production of the laws that regulate
citizens and their government.
III. POPULAR PARTICIPATION, THE SECOND BASIC COMPONENT OF
DEMOCRACY

Part II identified democratic openness as one of the basic
components of democracy. In doing so, it presented democracy and
constitutionalism as conflicting ideals. Democracy presupposes a
political terrain that is never closed (or, put slightly differently, a
constituent power that is not consumed with the adoption of a
constitution). Constitutionalism, in contrast, is a system in which the
people's ability to alter the constitutional forms appears to be severely
constrained. This Part examines the other basic component of
democracy: the ideal of popular participation in the positing of all
laws. 00 Constitutionalism's fear of change not only makes
constitutional change difficult and unlikely; it prevents ordinary
citizens from proposing, deliberating, and deciding on any
transformation it considers necessary. Democracy (and its component
of democratic openness) requires not only that constitutions are
susceptible to re-constitution, but also that they are susceptible to reconstitution through democratic, and hence participatory, procedures.

99. Judicial review of federal legislation in the U.S. was established by a
decision of its Supreme Court, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), but a
constitutional amendment would probably be needed to abolish it as a juridical
possibility.
100. In discussing the ideal of popular participation, I will sometimes refer to
the demands democracy imposes on a constitutional regime on a day-to-day basisto popular participation in the activity of governing and ordinary lawmaking. It
should remain clear, however, that these references are merely meant to show that
popular participation has always been part of the idea of democracy, but this
Article's focus is with popular participation in constitutionalchange.
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This is why, as mentioned earlier, a flexible constitution (flexible in
the sense that it can be altered as if it were an ordinary law) will not
do, at least not from a democratic perspective. 10 '
That democracy involves popular participation is almost
axiomatic. Democratic self-government not only entails a "community
of citizens-the demos-[that] proclaims that it is absolutely
sovereign" (i.e., the ideal of democratic openness); it also involves an
affirmation of the "equal sharing of activity and power" of all
citizens. 10 2 Democracy means "rule by the people." The Greeks, who
are usually attributed with the invention of democracy, attempted to
institutionalize this very definition in their juridical arrangements. The
most famous example comes from the fifth century Athenian
assembly, which was open to all male, adult, and free citizens1 03 and
The assembly debated and
met more than forty times a year.'
decided all important issues, such as foreign relations and taxation,
and its decisions were implemented by a committee of Magistrates
subjected to regular elections.o Each citizen was free to speak his

101. Thus, there are constitutions that can be amended through the same
procedures that are used to adopt and repeal ordinary legislation (e.g., the partially
unwritten constitution of New Zealand) and in that sense they do not seem (at least
in institutional terms) to reproduce constitutionalism's fear of constitutional change.
See PHILIP JOSEPH, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN NEW ZEALAND

9-10 (1993). However, they rarely incorporate procedures designed to increase the
degree of popular participation in the production and re-production of the
fundamental laws. The ideal of popular participation is one of the basic components
of democracy. This also applies to theories in which constitutional entrenchment is
seen as illegitimate, but democracy is presented as exhausted in a system of
parliamentary supremacy and the legislature is made equivalent to "the people." See,
e.g., WALDRON, supra note 70, at 283. For a critique of this aspect of Waldron's
approach, see Dimitrios Kyritsis, Representation and Waldron's Objection to
JudicialReview, 26 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 733 (2006).
102. CASTORIADIS, supra note 73, at 275.
103. DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY 19 (3d ed. 2006). These
limitations on citizenship are of course unacceptable under today's standards.
However, one must not forget that until the twentieth century women did not have
the right to vote in many countries, and it was only a few decades earlier that slavery
was abolished in some of the world's "oldest democracies."
104. Claude Ake, Dangerous Liaisons: The Interface of Globalization and
Democracy, in DEMOCRACY'S VICTORY AND CRISIS 282, 282 (Alex Hadenius ed.,
1997).
105. Id. In the year 487BCE, the selection of magistrates changed from
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mind, and was paid to attend so that even the poor could take time
from work and participate in the affairs of the polis.10 6 It is not clear
how many Athenians regularly attended the assembly. A good
measure might be Thucydides's statement that there were usually
5,000 citizens at the meetings, and the fact that the quorum required
for some decisions was set at 6,000.107
These institutions rested on the premise that common people were
not only competent to elect their governors, but to deliberate and
decide substantive issues.108 Athenians took popular participation so
seriously that, according to their laws, a citizen that did not take sides
while the city was in civil strife was deprived of political rights.109 It
should be clear that contemporary societies should not aspire to the
kind of democracy practiced in Athens.1 10 These juridical
arrangements, however, underscore the practical implications of
democracy's literal meaning and allow us to see how a full democracy
would look, even if such a regime could not be fully put into practice
today. If one wants to come close to democracy's realization, one
should attempt to design and defend institutions that are consistent
with it. The ideal of popular participation suggests that democracy, as
a regime of popular self-government, requires the participation of
citizens in positing and re-positing the laws that govern their lives,
constitutional laws included. This is in fact how "[e]ighteenth century
revolutionaries in Europe and the United States understood democracy

election to lottery. PAUL WOODRUFF, FIRST DEMOCRACY: THE CHALLENGE OF AN
ANCIENT IDEA 49 (2005).
106. Christopher W. Blackwell, The Assembly, in DEMOs: CLASSICAL
ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY 7 (A. Mahoney & R. Scaife eds., 2003), available at
http://www.stoa.org/projects/demos/democracy overview.pdf. In that respect, it is
useful recalling Plato's statement in the Protagorasthat although Athenians listened
to experts when debating technical issues such as the construction of buildings, in
the matter of politics "the man who rises to advise them on this may equally well be
a smith, a shoemaker, a merchant, a sea-captain, a rich man, a poor man, of good
family or of none." Id. at 3.
107. Id. at 21-22. For example, the adoption of a law conferring citizenship to
a foreigner required a quorum of 6,000. Id. at 22.
108. See Wood, supra note 65, at 62.
109. Castoriadis, supra note 73, at 275.
110. However, I agree with Paul Woodruff that Athenian democratic ideas are
still relevant in our times. WOODRUFF, supra note 105, at 16-17.
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... : the rule of everyone by everyone.""' And it is also why some
revolutionaries opposed it.11 2
For modem critics of democracy, popular participation was, by its
very nature, problematic: it involved granting decision-making power
to the lower classes of society and this was very discomforting. These
critics seemed to subscribe to Jean Bodin's view, which described
"popular states" as "the refuge of all disorderly spirits, rebels, traitors,
outcasts who encourage and help the lower orders to ruin the great.
The laws they hold in no esteem."" 3 For example, Adam Ferguson,
speaking during the eighteenth century, doubted that poor majorities,
people who all their lives had confined their efforts to their own
subsistence, could be trusted with the government of nations. 114 Such
men, he wrote, "when admitted to deliberate on matters of state, bring
to its councils confusion and tumult, or servility and corruption; and
seldom suffer it to repose from ruinous factions, or the effects of
resolutions ill formed and ill conducted."'" 5
Not surprisingly, the founding fathers of the American republic
had similar ideas. As Paul Woodruff noted, America's founders were
"men who feared government by the people and were trying to keep it
at bay."1 6 Thus Madison famously warned that "[pure] democracies
have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever
been found incompatible with personal security, or the rights of
property; and have in general been as short in their lives, as they have
been violent in their deaths."" 7 Madison's contempt of democracy can

111. MICHAEL HARDT & ANTONIO NEGRI,
DEMOCRACY INTHE AGE OF EMPIRE 240 (2004).

MULTITUDE:

WAR

AND

112. In the eighteenth century, democracy was generally understood in its
direct, rather than representative, variant. This, of course, raised the stakes
exponentially and made democracy an even more unattractive ideal. See BARRY
HOLDEN, UNDERSTANDING LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 2 (1988).

113.

Stephen

S.

Wolin,

Fugitive

Democracy, in

DEMOCRACY

AND

DIFFERENCE: CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE POLITICAL 37 (Seyla Benhabib

ed., 1996) (citation omitted).
114.

ADAM FERGUSON, AN ESSAY ON THE HISTORY OF CIVIL SOCIETY 286 (2d

ed., London, A. Miller & T. Cadel 1768) (1767).
115. Id.
116.
117.

WOODRUFF, supra note 105, at 4.
THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 30, at 46 (James Madison). Madison

defines a pure democracy as a "a Society, consisting of a small number of citizens,
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be understood as a result of his general fear of "tyranny" (defined as
any severe deprivation of a natural right), particularly the "tyranny of
the majority." It is interesting to note, however, that Madison's
writings do not show much anxiety towards minority tyranny." 8 For
instance, at one point he maintained that universal suffrage-a
necessary but not sufficient component of the political equality
implied by the idea of popular participation-would result in a
"permanent animosity between opinion and property."ll 9 It is not
surprising that he was not sympathetic to the democracy practiced in
Athens and its maximization of popular participation. In a frequently
cited passage, Madison claimed that even if "every Athenian citizen
[had] been a Socrates every Athenian assembly would still have been

a mob."

20

For both the Greeks and the critics mentioned above, the meaning
and practical implications of democracy were reasonably clear.
Democracy meant rule by the people and it required the adoption of
institutions that would result in the participation of all citizens in the
activity of law-making. Moreover, they believed the rule of the people
extended to all matters and all laws; no issue was to be removed from
the democratic process.'21 In contemporary literature, the idea that
who assemble and administer the Government in person." Id.
118. ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 9 (1970).
119. Ake, supra note 104, at 283. See also JENNIFER TOLBERT ROBERTS,
ATHENS ON TRIAL: THE ANTIDEMOCRATIC TRADITION IN WESTERN THOUGHT 183
(1994) (providing John Adams's arguments in favor of restricting the vote to
property owners).
120. THE FEDERALIST NO. 55, supra note 30, at 281 (James Madison).
Madison's negative views about democracy, universal suffrage, and popular
majorities seem to have softened some years after the creation of the U.S.
Constitution, where he appears more sympathetic to basic democratic principles. See
ROBERT DAHL, How DEMOCRATIC ISTHE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION? 33-37 (2002).

121. This does not mean, however, that Athenian democracy never had
procedures in place that placed limitations on popular decision-making (even if
decisions about all matters took place through democratic processes). For instance,
during the fourth century BCE, a distinction was made between making/revising
laws and voting on policy decisions. WOODRUFF, supra note 105, at 33-34.
Proposals made in the Assembly concerning policy decisions (sometimes called
"decrees") had to be consistent with the law (or, put in another way, had to be
consistent with the Athenian Constitution). Id. at 34. New laws or changes to
existing laws could only be framed by a legislative panel chosen by lot (the
Nomothetai), and then approved by the Assembly. Id. If the Assembly wished to
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actual participation in the production of the law is an essential
component of democracy is no longer universal.122 In fact, the very
meaning of democracy has become a topic of great debate.' 23 At least
in part, this controversy is a result of the complexity of our time, the
fact that we live in large societies, and the fact that citizens do not
appear to be interested in public affairs.124 In short, large and complex
societies render the ideal of rule by the people anachronistic.1 25
That, however, cannot be the only answer, for the institutions that
we call "democratic" are by no means the most democratic forms of
political organization that could exist in societies like ours. Yet these
institutions are not only considered "democratic" by many political
and legal theorists, but are celebrated as the kind of institutions that
democrats should defend. This Article will next briefly consider some
approaches to democracy in which the "rule of the people" no longer
seems to require institutions designed to realize the ideal of popular
participation. These approaches to democracy come very close to
describing what is taken to be "democratic" in the twenty-first
century, and what passes for "democracy" in constitutional regimes
that rest on the prevailing theory of constitutionalism.
A. The Demise of PopularParticipationand the
Reformulation of Democracy
Claude Ake sees in the contested nature of the term "democracy"
a sort of false consciousness and argues that the supposed confusion
over its meaning is a mystification.' 26 Ake sees this "confusion" not as

change the laws (e.g., the Constitution), it needed to refer any proposals to the
Nomothetai before being able to vote on them. Id.
122. Ake, supra note 104, at 284.
123. Id.
124. The idea that people are not interested in public affairs needs, in any case,
to be weighted against the lack of opportunities for popular participation in political
decision-making and the fact that decisions about many important and interesting
matters are usually left in the hands of a few (e.g., the courts). See RICHARD D.
PARKER, HERE, THE PEOPLE RULE: A CONSTITUTIONAL POPULIST MANIFESTO 72-73

(1994).
125. Cf Sofia Nasstram, Representative Democracy as Tautology: Ankersmit
and Lefort on Representation, 5 EuR. J. POL. THEORY 321 (2006).
126. Ake, supra note 104, at 283.
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the result of a lexical difficulty-for him the concept of democracy is
uncharacteristically precise-but as "a manifestation of an endless
political struggle raging over the appropriation of democratic
legitimacy."l 27 Ake's argument that debates over the meaning of
"democracy" are merely struggles for political legitimacy goes too far,
however, because, in his presentation of democracy as unquestionably
precise, Ake fails to consider the practical importance of questions on
the meaning of democracy, such as what an increase in democracy in
contemporary societies would mean or how to adopt institutions that
allow a greater degree of self-government. But when one examines the
treatment that democracy receives in the work of some influential
democratic theorists, as well as what passes for democracy in actual
political practice, it is inevitable to suspect that there is some truth to
Ake's statement.
Take the example of Joseph Schumpeter, whose Capitalism,
Socialism and Democracyl28 influenced a wave of works in
democratic theory that appeared after the Second World War.129
Schumpeter wanted to offer a non-normative account of democracy, a
description of how democracy worked in the real world. With very
good reason, some authors identify in Schumpeter and his followers
"an ideology which is grounded upon a profound distrust of the
majority of ordinary men and women"1 30 and a lack of enthusiasm for
democracy.13 1 But, regardless of the merits of his approach,
Schumpeter's conception exemplifies what democracy is normally
thought to require from peoples and their governments in the twentyfirst century. Schumpeter described democracy as a certain type of
institutional arrangement designed to arrive at political decisions.13 2
Democracy was to be understood as a method and disassociated from

127. Id.
128. J.A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND
129. See, e.g., DAHL, supra note 118; ANTHONY

DEMOCRACY

(1976).

DowNS, AN ECONOMIC
THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1956); HARRY ECKSTEIN, A THEORY OF STABLE
DEMOCRACY (1961); GIOvANm SARTORI, DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1962).

130. PETER BACHRACH, THE THEORY OF DEMOCRATIC ELITISM: A CRITIQUE
93 (1967).
131. C.B. MACPHERSON, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 43
(1977).
132. SCHUMPETER, supra note 128, at 243.
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any particular ends, such as the achievement of justice or the
improvement of people's lives.1 33
According to Schumpeter, the institutional arrangement that we
call democracy had to be defined in a realistic way; the definition had
to be true to what "sponsors of the democratic method really mean by
this term."1 34 Thus, his conception rejected the premise of what he
called the "classical doctrine" (identified with authors such as
Rousseau), which attributed to "the people" a participatory and
decision-making role that rested on empirically unrealistic
foundations. 135 Schumpeter thus advanced the following definition of
the democratic method: "That institutional arrangement for arriving at
political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by
means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote."l 36 Under
Schumpeter's theory, the competition for leadership, or political
power, is what distinguishes democracy from other political methods.
The people's only role in a democracy is to vote occasionally for
candidates in competitive elections, not to decide policies: citizens
have to understand that "once they have elected an individual, a
political action is his business and not theirs."l 3 7
The main problem with Schumpeter's definition of the
"democratic method," and his exclusion of popular participation from
it, is not that it might encounter theoretical difficulties or offend
democratic sensibilities. The main problem is that Schumpeter comes
very close to describing the kind of system that is routinely called
democratic in our times. Samuel Huntington expressed this well in his
triumphal claim, "By the 1970s, the debate was over and Schumpeter
had won."l 38 Consider, for example, the following statement by
133. MICHAEL SAWARD, DEMOCRACY 39 (2003).
134. SCHUMPETER, supra note 128, at 269.
135.
136.

CAROLE PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 4 (1970).
SCHUMPETER, supra note 128, at 269.

137. Id. at 295. The minor role Schumpeter assigns to popular majorities rests
on the view that most people are ignorant about political issues, irrational in their
preferences, and easily manipulated by politicians, etc. See SAWARD, supra note
133, at 42. This view is also shared by many contemporary scholars. See, e.g.,
BRYAN D. CAPLAN, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL VOTER: WHY DEMOCRACIES

CHOOSE BAD POLICIES 2 (2007); Russell Hardin, IgnorantDemocracy, 18 CRITICAL
REV. 179, 179-84 (2006).
138.

SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE
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Joseph Nye, a leading liberal political thinker: "Democracy requires
government by officials who are accountable and removable by the
majority of people in a jurisdiction."l 39 Or consider the definition of
"conventional" democratic theory provided by Barry Holden: "In
conventional democratic theory the people have the negative role of
choosing, at elections, among options presented to them. The options
involve personnel and policies-different candidates and their various
plans-and the choice of personnel is important as well as the choice
of policies." 40 This radical separation between rulers and the ruled is
far away from what democracy involved just a few centuries ago.
Democracy has become a form of government that most eighteenth
century anti-democrats would be willing to support and champion. 14 1
This change in the practical implications of democracy and the
demise of popular participation are exemplified in Robert Dahl's
arguments on the prospects for democracy in contemporary societies.
LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY 6 (1991).
139. JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., POWER IN THE GLOBAL INFORMATION AGE: FROM
REALISM TO GLOBALIZATION 202 (2004).
140. HOLDEN, supra note 112, at 60.
141. Of course, not all democratic theorists support popular participation's
relegation to a secondary role. There are certainly authors who consider popular
participation an essential component of democracy, even if their proposals for
increased popular participation are rarely included (or if included, quickly
dismissed) in most contemporary discussions about what democracy requires from
constitutional regimes. See, e.g., BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY:
PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A NEW AGE 8 (1984); ALLAN HUTCHINSON, THE
PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DEMOCRATIZED 170 (2009); MACPHERSON, supra
note 131, at 108-15; PATEMAN, supra note 135, at 1. There are also some theorists,
usually defenders of some form of deliberative democracy, who have advanced
proposals that seek to improve the quality of public discussion and debate, or to
discover what the population would want if it was able to come together and
deliberate about different issues. Although valuable for many reasons, these
proposals rarely involve giving ordinary citizens the power to decide on important
constitutional changes. Instead, these theorists maintain that, in a democracy,
participation also means being able to play a role in the decision-making process,
and, in the context of popular participation, that role should be decisive (i.e., not
subject to changes through the ordinary institutions of government). See, e.g.,
BRUCE ACKERMAN & JAMES S. FISHKIN, DELIBERATION DAY 4-5 (2004); ANNA
COOTE & JO LENAGHAN, CITIZEN JURIES: THEORY INTO PRACTICE 6-8 (1997);
JAMEs S. FISHKIN, DEMOCRACY AND DELIBERATION: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR
DEMOCRATIC REFORM 1 (1991); ETHAN J. LEIB, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA: A PROPOSAL FOR A POPULAR BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 12 (2004).

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol47/iss1/3

36

Colón-Ríos: De-Constitutionalizing Democracy

2010]

DE-CONSTITUTIONALIZING DEMOCRACY

77

As Dahl acknowledges, the idea of democracy has become nearly
universal today, and it is the standard that almost all contemporary
regimes claim to uphold and praise as the sole criterion of legitimacy
for any political system.14 2 Nevertheless, for Dahl, countries that call
themselves "democratic" are no more than polyarchies. A polyarchy
exists in a country whose institutions satisfy only the minimal
requirements for the democratic process.143 In very general terms,
these minimal requirements amount to a system that allows for the
regular election of representatives and the protection of basic political
rights. 1 " A polyarchy is perfectly compatible with the rule of elites
(Schumpeter's conception of democracy, for example, can be made
consistent with the institutional requirements of a polyarchy), and
does not require the actual participation of the ruled in political
decision-making.145 In this sense, Dahl's theory of polyarchy can be
understood as recognition of a failure of contemporary states to meet
the demands of democracy. As Sheldon Wolin argued, although the
official spokesmen of most industrialized countries would insist on the
democratic character of their governments, few would argue "the
people" actually rule in any of them.146
The democracy of contemporary societies thus consists of two
principal elements: a liberal constitution that enables all citizens to
"participate" in government through the election of officials at pre142. DAHL, supra note 118, at233.
143. Id. at 233. These institutions require: (1) that elected officials have
control over government decisions about policy; (2) that officials are elected in
relatively frequent, fair, and free elections; (3) that the right to vote is extended to all
adults; (4) that most adults have the right to run for public offices; (5) that freedom
of expression is protected; (6) that citizens have access to alternative sources of
information that are not monopolized by the government or any single group; and
(7) that citizens have the right to form autonomous associations, such as political
parties, that attempt to influence the government by competing in elections and other
peaceful means. Id. As Sheldon Wolin has stated, the requirements of "democracy"
are so precise that world powers periodically dispatch experts to countries of the socalled Third World to determine whether they have been met. Wolin, supra note
113, at 42.
144. DAHL, supra note 118, at 233.
145. HELD, supra note 103, at 163.
146. Sheldon S. Wolin, Norm and Form: The Constitutionalizing of
Democracy, in ATHENIAN POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF

AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, supra note 65, at 29, 38.
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determined intervals and free competition between highly organized
economic and social interests (e.g., political parties).14 7 This is the
democracy of "public opinion," "opinion polls," and voting every few
years in general elections. This democracy, that retains little of the
ideal of popular participation, has become the standard in
constitutional democracies. It is a democracy that fits well with
constitutionalism's fear of constitutional change and, according to the
prevailing constitutionalist attitude, results in institutions that, by
attempting to make constitutional change difficult and unlikely, do not
allow ordinary citizens to become the actual authors of fundamental
laws. The absence of opportunities for popular participation in
constitutional change is highly compatible with a conception of
democracy in which popular participation no longer figures as a
priority.
In this respect, it is interesting to note the ways in which the ideal
of popular participation figures into U.S. progressive constitutional
thought. Now people are not expected to participate in the production
of the fundamental laws, but to mobilize in favor of particular
changes. The emphasis on "popular mobilization" in the context of
constitutional change was popularized by Bruce Ackerman and his
theory of constitutional moments. 148 During a "constitutional
moment" (Ackerman's classic examples are the Founding, the
Reconstruction, and the New Deal), changes that amount to a
constitutional amendment are "ratified by a mobilized mass of
American citizens expressing their assent through extraordinary
institutional forms." 49 This emphasis on popular mobilization (which
is accompanied by a conspicuous absence of references to actual
popular participation in the process of constitutional re-making) is
now present in the work of various progressive legal scholars,
including those who see interpretation as the main site of
constitutional change.15 0 For example, Jack Balkin argues that
members of each generation must figure out what the Constitution's
promises mean for them and that "[m]any of the most significant
147. See Wolin, supra note 113, at 33.
148. 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 22 (1991).
149. Bruce Ackerman, Neo-Federalism?, in CONSTITUTIONALISM

AND

DEMOCRACY, supra note 67, at 153, 163-64.
150. See infra notes 153-154 and accompanying text.
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mobilizations and countermobilizations by social and political
movements that offered competing interpretations of what the
Constitution really means."' 5 1
In a similar vein, Robert Post and Reva Siegel have advanced a
"democratic constitutionalism [that] affirms the role of representative
government and mobilized citizens in enforcing the Constitution at the
same time as it affirms the role of courts in using professional legal
reason to interpret the Constitution." 152 What does mobilization mean?
What do these theorists have in mind when they speak about "popular
mobilization," "mobilized majorities," or getting the "mobilized
support of the people"? According to Ackerman, mobilization seems
to be equivalent to getting the support of the people (usually
expressed through general elections), thus the need for leaders to
"creturn to the People and mobilize their considered support before
foundational principles may be revised in a democratic way."153
Getting the support of the people (i.e., being able to "mobilize" public
opinion in favor of a particular change) is, of course, different from
promoting citizen participation in formulating fundamental laws
through constitutional mechanisms (such as constituent assemblies
triggered by popular initiatives).154 Now, mobilization might also
include a spectrum of different political acts: massive public
manifestations, acts of civil disobedience, and other kinds of protests.
Authors such as Balkin, Post, and Siegel have these kinds of political
151. Jack Balkin, Fidelity to Text and Principle, in THE CONSTITUTION IN
2020, supra note 11, at 11, 21.
152. Post & Siegel, supra note 9, at 379.
153. 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 6 (1998).
Consider, for example, Ackerman's proposal for the "Popular Sovereignty
Initiative," a democratically superior alternative to Article V:
Rather than aiming for an Article Five amendment, the vehicle
for constitutional change should be a special statute that I will
call the Popular Sovereignty Initiative. Proposed by a (secondterm) President, this Initiative should be submitted to
Congress for two-thirds approval, and should then be
submitted to the voters at the next two Presidential elections.
If it passes these tests, it should be accorded constitutional
status by the Supreme Court.
Id. at 415.
154. See infra Part IV.
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acts in mind when they use the term "mobilization." 1" While these
informal activities, through which ordinary citizens insist on making
their government responsive to their needs and interests, are
fundamental in any democratic polity, they should not be the only
means available for citizens to transform the constitutional regime in
important ways, at least not in a democratic constitutional regime.
The realization of the ideal of popular participation, of democracy
at the level of the fundamental laws, requires that ordinary citizens
have a central decision-making role, not just the possibility of
influencing the actions of ordinary government (imagine, for example,
a dictator that claims democratic credentials because he only adopts
policies that are "responsive" to "popular mobilization"). Formal
mechanisms of participation, in which citizens are able to propose,
deliberate and decide on changes to the content of their constitution,
are also an important part of a commitment to the democratic ideal. In
this sense, it is important to note that in some twentieth century
literature, the term "mobilization" had a negative connotation. 156
Mobilization was identified with mass activity in countries led by
authoritarian governments, and authors talked about "the
pseudoparticipation of totalitarian mobilist regimes."' 57 Mobilization
occurred when popular engagement was stimulated and led by the
authorities, while actual popular participation involved a greater
degree of initiative from ordinary citizens. Of course, when
progressive constitutional theorists talk about a mobilized citizenry
today, they are not referring to mobilization in this negative way.
There is still, however, an enormous difference between government
being more or less responsive to public opinion and citizens
proposing, deliberating, and deciding on the future of their
constitutional regime. 5 8
155. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 151, at 21; Robert Post & Reva Siegel,
Democratic Constitutionalism, in THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020, supra note 11, at 25,
25.
156. See JACK H. NAGEL, PARTICIPATION 3-4 (1987).
157. DAVID HAPGOOD, THE ROLE OF POPULAR
DEVELOPMENT 21 (1969).

PARTICIPATION

IN

158. Moving in the direction of giving ordinary citizens the power to alter the
fundamental laws under which they live, however, might make progressives
nervous. There seems to be a widespread distrust of ordinary citizens and a
widespread belief that these citizens would not make the kinds of decisions
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IV. THE DE-CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF DEMOCRACY

Constitutional democracy, the liberal attempt at balancing
democracy and constitutionalism, is not a true balance. Rather, it is an
imbalance in favor of constitutionalism, and one that negates
democracy in important ways. This view of constitutional democracy
presumes that democracy and constitutionalism are complementary
ideals, that democracy can only be realized in a liberal constitutional
form, and that the only realistic and desirable conception of
democracy in the context of contemporary societies is something akin
to Dahl's polyarchy. Under this conception, to speak about
constitutional democracy is to speak about constitutionalism in its
typical, liberal form. Constitutional democrats, like Eisgruber and
Holmes, insist on emphasizing the importance of constitutionalism to
democracy while repressing those features of the democratic ideal that
appear to endanger the established constitutional regime.159 The idea
is that the purpose of constitutional democracy is to protect democracy
from itself.160 However, the argument presented in this Article
suggests it is actually the other way around: constitutional democracy,
by remaining loyal to constitutionalism's tenets, protects the
established constitutional regime from democracy. Constitutional
democracy is concerned with the constitutionalization of democracy,
not with the democratization of constitutionalism. In the words of a
leading constitutional democrat, "Constitutionalism, though it has
adopted under modern conditions some of the elements of the
democratic political process, attempts to tame the people's democratic
rule." 16 1
Although constitutional democracy is the dominant theory on the
ideal relationship between constitutionalism and democracy, it is
certainly not the only theory possible. This Article concludes by
outlining the basic premises of a conception of constitutionalism that
progressives cherish. Richard T. Ford has nicely captured this attitude, which he
characterizes as "a combination of defeatism and smug condescension," in the
following passage: "Well, of course, our position is unpopular because so many
people are prejudiced; that's why we need the courts." Ford, supra note 91, at 149.
159. See Bennie Honig, Dead Rights, Live Futures: A Reply to Habermas's
ConstitutionalDemocracy, 29 POL. THEORY 792, 800 (2001).
160. See Holmes, supra note 67, at 197.
161. SAJ6, supra note 1, at 53.
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is more sensitive to the ideals of popular participation and democratic
openness. This conception is called weak constitutionalism. Weak
constitutionalism sees the constitution as "the creation and property of
a free and democratic people,"l 62 not as the exclusive domain of
governmental authorities, jurists, or experts. 163 Because it takes
seriously the ideals of democratic openness and popular participation,
it does not perceive an active citizenry as a threat (even when its
actions might result in the destruction of the existing constitution and
the emergence of a new one). Instead, weak constitutionalism sees
constitutional changes as opportunities to correct existing injustices.
By taking constitutions as what they inevitably are-the product of
human beings and the result of political struggle-weak
constitutionalism recognizes the necessity of keeping the
constitutional regime open, or keeping the political terrain never
closed. In this respect, weak constitutionalism is an attempt to deconstitutionalize democracy-to liberate it from particular
constitutional forms that impede rather than promote the realization of
the ideals of democratic openness and popular participation.
A. Weak Constitutionalismand ConstituentPower
The main characteristic of weak constitutionalism is its approach
to the people's constituent power: instead of seeing constituent power
as a threat, it sees it as the possibility of correcting existing injustices
through highly participatory procedures. Constituent power, a concept

162. Jeremy Waldron, Dirty Little Secret, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 510, 521 (1998)
(reviewing ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, WHAT SHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIS
BECOME? (1996)).
163. Weak constitutionalism inevitably has a "populist" bent. Today, the term
populism is used in a derogatory way: populist regimes are basically dictatorships
covered by a thick layer of democratic rhetoric and a populist regime is what occurs
when a democratic process goes wrong (that is, when citizens opt for a government
or system of government repudiated by whoever is calling it populist). Needless to
say, I do not use the term "populism" in this way, but as a way of describing a
regime based on democratic self-rule. See ERNESTO LACLAU, ON POPULIST REASON
3-16 (2005) (providing an account of the historical uses of the word "populism");
Frank

Michelman,

Constitutional

PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS

Authorship,

in

CONSTITUTIONALISM:

64, 76 (Larry Alexander ed., 1998) (discussing

populism and proceduralism).
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until recently absent from Anglo-American constitutional theory,' 64
means constitution-making power, the source of the production of
juridical norms. 16 5 In its classical formulations (those of Emmanuel
Sieyes and Carl Schmitt), constituent power is seen as an unlimited
power, a power that assumes the constitutional regime is radically
open. Constituent power, wrote Sieyes and Schmitt, "puts an end to
positive law, because it is the source and the supreme master of
positive law,"1 66 and is capable of "producing from itself . .. ever

164. At the time of the American Revolution, however, there were authors
whose ideas came very close to the theory of constituent power. Consider the
following statement by James Wilson: "The consequence is, that the people may
change the constitutions whenever and however they please. This is a right of which
no positive institution can ever deprive them." 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL
STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS
RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 432
(Jonathan Elliot ed., J.B. Lippincot Co. 2d ed. rev. 1891). In fact, Claude Klein
argues that the origins of this concept are to be found in the American Revolution,
not the French Revolution as is usually maintained. Klein, supra note 21, at 31-32.
There is a growing bibliography on constituent power (which is partly a result of the
renewed interest in Carl Schmitt's work, now increased with the translation of his
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY (Jeffrey Seitzer ed., trans., 2007) into English). See, e.g.,
THE PARADOX OF CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 22; Andrew Arato, Carl Schmitt
and the Revival of the Doctrine of Constituent Power in the United States, 21
CARDOZO L. REV. 1739 (2000); Lior Barshack, Constituent Power as Body: Outline
of a Constitutional Theology, 56 U. TORONTO L.J. 185 (2006); Renato Cristi, The
Metaphysics of Constituent Power: Schmitt and the Genesis of the Chile's 1980
Constitution, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1749 (2000); Renato Cristi, Carl Schmitt on
Sovereignty and Constituent Power, in LAW AS POLITICS: CARL SCHMITT'S
CRITIQUE OF LIBERALISM 179 (David Dyzenhaus ed., 1998); Andreas Kalyvas,
PopularSovereignty, Democracy, and the Constituent Power, 12 CONSTELLATIONS
223 (2005) [hereinafter Kalyvas, Popular Sovereignty, Democracy, and the
Constituent Power]; Andreas Kalyvas, Hegemonic Sovereignty: Carl Schmitt,
Antonio Gramsci and the Constituent Prince, 5 J. POL. IDEOLOGIES 373 (2000);
Ulrich K. Preuss, Constitutional Power Making for the New Polity: Some
Deliberationson the Relations Between Constituent Power and the Constitution, 14
CARDOZO L. REV. 639 (1993).
165. The most famous formulations of constituent power can be found in the
works of Emmanuel Sieyes and Carl Schmitt. See generally EMMANUEL JOSEPH
SIEYES, WHAT IS THE THIRD ESTATE? 126-32 (1963); SCHMITT, supra note 164. For

contemporary discussions of this concept see Kalyvas, Popular Sovereignty,
Democracy, and the Constituent Power, supra note 164; THE PARADOX OF
CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 22 (providing essays by various authors).
166. SIEYES, supra note 165, at 128.
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renewing forms and organizations."l 67 To say that the people are the
bearers of the constituent power is to say that they ought to be
sovereign and that, in the exercise of that sovereignty, they should be
allowed to have any constitution they want.
Contemporary conceptions of constituent power, in addition to
recognizing the constituent subject's unlimited faculty to create and
re-create constitutions, emphasize constituent power's collective
character. 16 8 Thus, some authors define constituent power as the
power to create a constitution together, with the participation of those
subject to it. 169 Preuss has expressed this idea clearly: "Essentially, the
constituent power is the power of a collective body, which by the very
act of constitution-giving, exercises its right to self-rule." 7 0 As the
reader may note, constituent power seems to have a direct relationship
with the ideals of democratic openness and popular participation: it
expresses the idea of an unlimited power to re-create the fundamental
laws through participatory mechanisms. This is not a coincidence,
since democracy and constituent power are related in important ways:
constituent power can be understood as the expression of the
democratic ideal at the level of fundamental laws.1 71 In most
167. SCHMrIr, supra note 164, at 128.
168. There are some authors, however, that consider constituent power mostly
in the context of Schmitt's theory of the state of emergency or that identify it with
the power that individuals in the state of nature exercise when they decide to enter
civil society. See David Dyzenhaus, The Politics of the Question of Constituent
Power, in THE PARADOX OF CONST1TUTIONALISM, supra note 22, at 129, 129;
Murray Forsyth, Thomas Hobbes and the Constituent Power of the People, 29 POL.
STUD. 191, 192 (1981). These approaches, in my view, neglect constituent power's
democratic potential.
169. As Andreas Kalyvas has explained, the term constituere, which is formed
by the prefix con ("with," or "together") and the suffix statuere ("to set up," "to
construct," or "to place"), literally means "the act of founding together, founding in
concert, creating jointly, or co-establishing . . . The correct use of the term 'to
constitute' prescribes that if one wants to constitute a new constitution, for example,
one ought to coinstitute it, to institute it jointly with others." Andreas Kalyvas, The
Basic Norm and Democracy in Hans Kelsen's Legal and Political Theory, 32 PHIL.
& Soc. CRMCIsM 573, 588-89 (2006).
170. Preuss, supra note 164, at 647.
171. As Antonio Negri has noted, "To speak of constituent power is to speak
of democracy. In the modem age the two concepts have often been related . . . ."
NEGRI, supra note 23, at 1; see also Joel I. Col6n-Rios, The Legitimacy of the
Juridical:Democracy and the Dilemmas of Constitutional Reform, 48 OSGOODE
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constitutional regimes, however, constituent power is buried under a
complicated amendment procedure that places the power to alter the
constitutional text in the hands of government. We have seen the antidemocratic consequences of this traditional approach throughout the
previous pages.
In attempting to de-constitutionalize democracy, weak
constitutionalism seeks to change the traditional approach in at least
three ways. First, unlike the prevailing conception of
constitutionalism, weak constitutionalism does not maintain the
precedence of the constitutional forms over the constituent power of
the people. It rests on the idea that there is a permanent tension
between constitutional forms and constituent power, between
constitutionalism and democracy. Instead of privileging the
supremacy of the former by adopting a constitution that is difficult or
impossible to change, it seeks to leave the door open for the future reemergence of constituent power. In doing so, weak constitutionalism
does not seek to resolve this tension. On the contrary, it recognizes the
tensions between constitutionalism and democracy as an inevitable
consequence of having a constitution and makes tensions even more
obvious by giving citizens the institutional means for acting together
to take precedence over the constitutional text, even if only

episodically.' 72
Second, weak constitutionalism supposes that important
constitutional transformations should not be the work of ordinary
institutions. These institutions are designed to operate at the level of
daily governance, where intense episodes of popular participation are
not always possible. In this respect, it cannot be stressed enough that

HALL L.J. 199 (2010)

(discussing the concept of constituent power and its

relationship to democracy, constitutional change and democratic legitimacy).
172. The way weak constitutionalism approaches popular participation in
constitutional change distinguishes it from the work of Sanford Levinson (despite
the similarities with that author's approach). Levinson maintains his proposal for a
constitutional convention would be irrelevant if the structural changes he considers
necessary could be achieved through other methods (like judicial interpretation).
LEVINSON, supra note 7, at 164. In contrast, weak constitutionalism seeks to
perpetuate the people's ability to re-model the fundamental laws, to institutionalize
some means for ordinary citizens to engage in profound and participatory episodes
of constitutional change whenever they consider it necessary and regardless of the
substance or the "defective" character of the constitution in question.
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weak constitutionalism is not about a constitution that, just like
ordinary law, can be changed by democratic majorities if the term
"democratic majorities" simply refers to a majority of state officials
sitting in a legislature. When an important constitutional
transformation is needed, weak constitutionalism recommends
changes to the constitution be made through an exercise of constituent
power similar to that present when the constitution was adopted in the
first place. The issue here is not simply one of representative versus
direct democracy. 173 Popular participation cannot be limited to a
process in which experts draft the constitutional text and then submit
it to a "yes" or "no" vote in a referendum (which is usually subject to
mass advertising and does not necessarily promote discussion and
debate among citizens). 174 Weak constitutionalism requires
mechanisms through which citizens are allowed to participate, as
much as possible, in the modeling and re-modeling of their
constitutional regime, mechanisms through which citizens trigger,
propose, and decide the content of their constitution.
Third, weak constitutionalism rests on a participatory conception
of the citizen. Citizens are not merely seen as human beings with
rights to participate in politics through the election of officials every
few years. Instead, citizens are those allowed to take part in the
(re)positing of the norms that govern the state. In other words, a
citizen is someone who participates in the democratic legitimation of
the constitutional regime and knows that, despite all the imperfections

173. For example, weak constitutionalism requires a degree of openness that is
neither possible nor desirable in the context of an ordinary legislature. Legislatures,
regardless of their relationship to the judiciary, operate under a constitutional
regime. If a legislature is granted the power to freely alter the constitution (even if
subjected to procedural hurdles not present in the adoption of ordinary laws) without
the intervention of citizens, democratic legitimacy is affected: it should be ordinary
citizens that decide the content of their constitution in a context of democratic
openness. In addition, re-writing a constitution often means altering the ways in
which legislative power is exercised (e.g., substituting a bicameral legislature with a
unicameral one, introducing institutions such as recall referendums, etc.). Having the
legislature deliberating and deciding about those kinds of changes would amount to
a violation of the old principle that no one should be a judge in his own case. See
Andrew Arato, Dilemmas Arising From the Power to Create Constitutions in
Eastern Europe, 14 CARDOzO L. REV. 661, 688 (1993).
174. James Tully, The Unfreedoms of the Moderns in Comparison to their
Ideals of ConstitutionalDemocracy, 65 MOD. L. REV. 204,213 (2002).
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of such an order, it can be changed. Not only is this conception of the
citizen more consistent with democracy, it also results in citizens
developing a sense of identification with the constitutional regime. It
encourages citizens to see the constitution as theirs, as their work-inprogress, and not simply as the embodiment of the will of a
mysterious "People" or as the product of judicial interpretation. 7 5
When important constitutional transformations are needed, this active
citizenry engages in different forms of political participation in order
to create the political climate necessary for constituent power to be
activated. The specific mechanisms through which constituent power
can be exercised vary. For example, one promising way in which
constitutent power may be exercised includes a constituent assembly
convened "from below" (triggered by a referendum initiated by the
citizens) and composed of elected delegates, whose work is subject to
ratification in a special election. 176
Ironically, these types of mechanisms are beginning to appear, not
in the fundamental laws of established Western liberal democracies,
but in the new constitutions of Latin America.177 These constitutions

175. See Frances Hagopian, Latin American Citizenship and Democratic
Theory, in CITIZENSHIP IN LATIN AMERICA 11, 27 (Joseph S. Tulchin & Meg

Ruthenburg eds., 2007) (providing an overview of the ways in which an active
citizenship can enhance civic virtue and improve the quality of democratic
governance); see also ROBERT D. PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: CIVIC
TRADITIONS IN MODERN ITALY 87-88 (1993).

176. This mechanism should be distinguished from the "popular initiative"
mechanism used to amend a constitution in several states in the United States, as
well as in several national constitutions. The popular initiative mechanism allows
citizens to propose a constitutional amendment through the collection of a number of
signatures, to be ratified in a referendum. Such a mechanism does not involve the
convening of an extraordinary assembly that would deliberate about the context of a
new or importantly transformed constitution. For a recent discussion of the history
and nature of the popular initiative mechanism to amend the constitution in the State
of Montana, see Anthony Johnstone, The ConstitutionalInitiative in Montana, 71
MONT. L. REv. 325 (2010). See also Joel I. Col6n-Rfos, The End of the
Constitutionalism-DemocracyDebate, 28 WINDSOR REV. LEGAL & Soc. ISSUES 25,
47 (2010) (discussing the constituent assembly convened "from below," and how it
is consistent with the idea of constituent power).
177. See, e.g., CONSTITUCION DE LA REPOBLICA DEL ECUADOR
[CONSTrruTION] Sept. 2008, arts. 441-442; CONSTiTUTION DE LA REPUBLICA
BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA [CONSTITUTION] Dec. 30, 1999, arts. 347-348,
translated in 20 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD: VENEZUELA 68
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contain provisions that allow citizens to trigger the convocation of a
constituent assembly through popular initiative (involving the
collection of a number of signatures ranging from 15% or 20% of the
registered electors). A constituent assembly triggered by this
mechanism is then considered a sovereign body, independent of the
ordinary (or constituted) powers of government. The assembly is
therefore not subject to any form of positive law, and operates
according to its own rules. It is commissioned to deliberate the content
of the current constitution and is authorized to replace the existing
juridical order and create an entirely new one. In the United States, the
recent attempt of a group in California to propose ballot initiatives
(labelled by some as verging "on the radical") with the objective of
calling a constitutional convention that would revise the current state
constitutional regime, bears important similarities to these constituent
assemblies.17 8 The adoption of this kind of mechanism, which would
(Gisbert H. Flanz ed., Anna I. Velve Torras trans., 2000). Article 411 of Bolivia's
constitution reads as follows:
The total reform of the Constitution, or those modifications that affect its
fundamental principles, its recognized rights, duties, and guarantees, or the
supremacy of the constitution and the process of constitutional reform,
will take place through a sovereign Constituent Assembly, activated by
popular will through a referendum. The referendum will be triggered by
popular initiative, by the signatures of at least twenty percent of the
electorate; by the Plurinational Legislative Assembly; or by the President
of the State. The Constituent Assembly will auto-regulate itself in all
matters. The entering into force of the reform will require popular
ratification through referendum.
NUEVA CONSTITUCION POLITICA DEL ESTADO [CONSTIrUTION] Oct. 2008, art. 411
(Bol.), translated in 2 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD: BOLIVIA
124-25 (Riidiger Wolfrum & Rainer Grote eds., 2009). For an example of a
"constitutional convention" convened "from below" in a state constitution, see
MONT. CONST. art. XIV (setting the threshold of signatures at 10% of the qualified
electors).

178. See Jennifer Steinhauer, Ballot Issues Attest to Anger in California, N.Y.
TIMEs, Jan. 9, 2010, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/10/us/

10calif.html?pagewanted=all. Repair California, the group proposing the popular
initiatives, recently announced the need to put the campaign on hold due to a
shortage of funds. California Constitutional Convention Campaign Put on Hold,
REPAIRCALIFORNIA.ORG
(Feb.
12,
2010),
http://www.countyofsb.org/
uploadedFiles/ceollegis/Att%202d-%2ONews%20articles-%20Constitutional%20
convention%20effort%20on%20hold.pdf. Not surprisingly, these kinds of
initiatives, as well as the very idea of a constitutional convention, are viewed with
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allow citizens to participate in the production of the democratic ideal
both directly (through the presentation of popular initiatives and a vote
on a referendum) and indirectly (through the institution of the
constituent assembly), is only possible under a weak conception of
constitutionalism.
V. FINAL THOUGHTS
Constitutionalism is characterized by an insistence on the
permanence of the established constitutional order and a fear of
constitutional change. This feature of constitutionalism is exemplified
in the writings of both classical and contemporary American
constitutional theorists, as well as in the amendment rules of most
with
is
inconsistent
Democracy
constitutions.
modem
constitutionalism's Lycurgian tendencies. Its basic components, the
ideal of democratic openness and popular participation, point towards
a constitution that is not only susceptible to change, but is susceptible
to democratic change, change that comes about through highly
participatory procedures. Constitutional democracy, by embracing
constitutionalism in its traditional version, rejects democratic
openness and abandons the ideal of popular participation by
supporting a weak version of democracy: a democracy detached from
its basic components.179 This Article follows the opposite route. It
argues that organizing our constitutional regimes in ways that promote
the realization of democratic openness and popular participation
requires leaving constitutions permanently open to profound (and
democratic) transformations.
This Article calls for constitutional theorists not to succumb to the
temptation of limiting themselves to finding new ways to interpret the
existing constitution. Constitutional theorists should devote their
energies to the parallel project of proposing structural constitutional
transformations that would facilitate the realization of the ideals of
democratic openness and popular participation. In defending a weak
suspicion by supporters of the traditional conception of constitutionalism. A good
example is the recent New York Times editorial about the proposed constitutional
convention in New York. See Editorial, The New York Convention Con, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 10, 2010, at A18, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/09/opinion/
09mon3. html.
179. See SAJ6, supra note 1, at 49 (defending "weak democracy").
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form of constitutionalism, this Article takes a small step in that
direction. Weak constitutionalism takes constituent power seriously
and demands the development of constitutional forms in which the
constituent subject is given the means to manifest from time to time.
This approach, it should be clear, in no way supposes that liberal
constitutionalism and democracy can be brought to a final resolution.
On the contrary, it recommends a different type of constitutionalism,
one that rests on the premise that a constitution is never finished and
that the "sovereignty of the people" is not consumed in the
constitution-making act.
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